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FIDUCIARY VOTERS?
D. THEODORE RAVE†
ABSTRACT
What does the majority owe the minority when issues are put to a
vote? This question is central to direct democracy, where voters bypass
the legislature and enact law directly. Some scholars have argued that
voters in direct democracy bear fiduciary-like duties because they act
as representatives when casting their ballots. The Supreme Court, by
contrast, has suggested that voters are not agents of the people and thus
have no fiduciary obligation. By focusing on whether direct-democracy
voters are representatives who bear duties, both sides have framed the
issue incorrectly. They have imported a legal tool—fiduciary duty—
from private law designed to combat a governance problem absent
from direct democracy: a principal–agent problem.
The real governance problem in direct democracy is the tyranny of
the majority. Once we focus on the right problem, private law—
specifically corporate law—provides useful insights. Corporate law
imposes duties—sometimes confusingly also called “fiduciary”—on
shareholder majorities to consider minority interests when voting.
Although these duties do not require the majority to subordinate its
own interests like a true duty of loyalty, courts recognize the need to
police for opportunism when the minority is vulnerable to exploitation.
Looking to these private-law voter duties can help explain a puzzling
line of Supreme Court cases reviewing the constitutionality of ballot
initiatives that rolled back legislation benefitting minority groups. In
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direct democracy, where structural protections for the minority are
lacking, courts may be playing a familiar institutional role from
corporate law: keeping the majority from exploiting the minority.
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INTRODUCTION
What does the majority owe the minority when issues are put to a
vote? In 2014, the Supreme Court faced that question in Schuette v.
Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action, Integration & Immigrant
Rights & Fight for Equality by Any Means Necessary (BAMN).1 Having
failed to persuade their elected officials (and the Supreme Court in
Grutter v. Bollinger2) to roll back affirmative action, a majority of
Michigan voters took matters into their own hands. They used a ballot
initiative to amend the state constitution to ban racial preferences in
public education.3 Civil rights groups challenged the amendment on
equal protection grounds. On one hand, as Justice Sotomayor argued
1. Schuette v. Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action, Integration and Immigrant Rights and
Fight for Equal. by Any Means Necessary (BAMN), 134 S. Ct. 1623 (2014).
2. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
3. Schuette, 134 S. Ct. at 1629 (plurality opinion).
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in dissent, this looked like a power play by the voters in the majority.
After losing in the legislative process, the majority used a majoritarian
tool—a ballot initiative—to place decisions over a policy favored by
minorities at a level of government where it is harder for minorities to
win.4 On the other hand, as Justice Kennedy argued for the plurality,
the voters merely took away a “grant of favored status” that the state
had no obligation to extend in the first place.5 They resorted to direct
democracy in order to “bypass public officials who were deemed not
responsive to the concerns of a majority of the voters with respect to a
policy of granting race-based preferences.”6 In upholding the
amendment, the Court reasoned that prohibiting voters from making
this sort of decision at a constitutional level because it affects a racial
minority would almost be tantamount to giving the minority a right to
leverage its minority status.7
The debate in Schuette over whether the majority can restructure
the political process in ways that disadvantage a racial minority is only
one aspect of the complicated relationship between majorities and
minorities more generally in a democracy. But it highlights a
fundamental question for direct (as opposed to representative)
democracy, some form of which is available in twenty-four states and
more than half of American cities8: What do voters owe each other
when issues are put to a vote?
In 2013, the Supreme Court suggested that the answer is
“nothing.” The Court in Hollingsworth v. Perry9 held that the voters
who sponsored California’s ballot initiative banning same-sex marriage
were “plainly not agents of the State” of California10 and did not owe

4. See id. at 1654, 1667–71 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
5. Id. at 1638 (plurality opinion).
6. Id. at 1636.
7. See id. at 1635 (explaining that those representing the interests of racial minority groups
“could attempt to advance th[eir] aims by demanding an equal protection ruling that any number
of matters be foreclosed from voter review or participation”).
8. Robert D. Cooter & Michael D. Gilbert, A Theory of Direct Democracy and the Single
Subject Rule, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 687, 694 (2010). The umbrella term “direct democracy”
includes both ballot initiatives, where citizens initiate the process by petitioning to place proposed
legislation or state constitutional amendments directly on the ballot, and referenda, where the
legislature refers a bill to the voters for ratification or rejection. Id. In this Article, I am focusing
on the problems raised by, and duties of voters in, ballot initiatives, where voters make law
directly without any input from the legislature.
9. Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013).
10. Id. at 2666–67.
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Californians any “fiduciary obligation.”11 These private parties thus
lacked standing to defend the initiative’s constitutionality on appeal
when state officials decided not to.12 Unlike California’s elected
representatives—who are fiduciaries—the Court treated the
proponents as ordinary voters who were free to pursue their own
narrow interests without considering any impact on others.13
Some legal scholars, by contrast, have recently argued that voters
in direct democracy owe fiduciary or fiduciary-like duties to the public
because they act in a “representative” capacity when they make law
directly.14 They would, accordingly, require voters to vote in the
interests of those they represent (whether conceived of as society as a
whole or some smaller political community) and not in their own selfinterest.15
The question I want to explore in this Article is whether it is
appropriate or useful to think of voters in direct democracy as
“fiduciaries.”16 So when, if ever, do voters owe duties to other voters
or to the public as a whole? And if they do, what is the proper
institutional and legal response? In trying to answer these questions, I
11. Id. at 2667 (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01 cmt. e (AM. LAW INST.
2006))).
12. See id. at 2667–68.
13. Id. (implying that state officials have fiduciary obligations because, unlike private parties
who “answer to no one,” state officials have been elected and have taken the oath of office). For
an argument that elected representatives have fiduciary obligations to the people they represent,
see D. Theodore Rave, Politicians as Fiduciaries, 126 HARV. L. REV. 671, 707–13 (2013).
14. See Edward B. Foley, Voters as Fiduciaries, 2015 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 153, 157–58, 181–82;
Michael Serota & Ethan J. Leib, The Political Morality of Voting in Direct Democracy, 97 MINN.
L. REV. 1596, 1596, 1611–20 (2013).
15. See Foley, supra note 14, at 153, 162–63. Foley notes:
Just as any other trustee breaches his or her fiduciary duty when using the trust’s assets
to promote the trustee’s own personal self-interest, so too voters breach their fiduciary
duties to society as a whole, present and future, if they exploit the electorate’s power
over the assets of commonwealth to promote their own personal self-interest.
Id. at 163; see also Serota & Leib, supra note 14, at 1596–98, 1605–11 (discussing the direct
democracy voter’s authority to make binding law, which “establishes a structural relationship of
political representation”).
16. Professor Edward Foley argues that voters are fiduciaries in both candidate elections and
direct democracy. Foley, supra note 14, at 157–58. Professors Michael Serota and Ethan Leib, on
the other hand, limit their claims about voter obligations to direct democracy. Serota & Leib,
supra note 14, at 1596. In this Article, I want to set aside the question of whether voters in
candidate elections are fiduciaries because, as Foley acknowledges, the argument for treating
voters as fiduciaries when they make law directly is more straightforward than for treating them
as fiduciaries when they delegate that task to legislators. See Foley, supra note 14, at 181–82. If
voters are not fiduciary representatives in direct democracy, then a fortiori they are not fiduciary
representatives in candidate elections. And candidate elections do not raise the distinctive risks
of minority oppression that direct democracy presents. See infra Part I.B.
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look to several areas of private law as a guide because—though the
tradition of fiduciary obligation in public law is long and
distinguished17—the contours of, and justifications for, fiduciary duties
are more fully worked out in private-law theory and doctrine.
Additionally, private law can serve as a nice model for analyzing
similarly structured governance problems in constitutional law because
there is often an actual social contract instead of just a hypothetical
one.
By focusing on whether or not direct-democracy voters are
representatives and thus bear corresponding fiduciary duties, both
sides of this debate have framed the issue incorrectly. They have
imported a legal tool from private law aimed at a governance problem
that is absent from direct democracy. The classic role that fiduciary
duties play in private-law representative relationships is to address a
principal–agent problem. The fiduciary duty of loyalty aims to align the
interests of an agent with those of the principal on whose behalf she
acts (to minimize “agency costs,” in economic parlance).18 I will refer

17. E.g., J.W. GOUGH, Political Trusteeship, in JOHN LOCKE’S POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 136,
183 (2d ed. 1973) (“[A] patriot king ‘will make one, and but one, distinction between his rights
and those of his people: he will look on his to be a trust and theirs a property.’” (quoting Henry
St. John Bollingbroke)); JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT AND A
LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION 74, (J.W. Gough ed., Basil, Blackwell & Mott Ltd. 1948)
(1690) (arguing that the legislative power “was only a fiduciary power to act for certain ends”).
Professor Robert Natelson has chronicled the fiduciary views of the Framing generation. E.g.,
Robert G. Natelson, The Constitution and the Public Trust, 52 BUFF. L. REV. 1077, 1124–68
(2004). For more contemporary work in this area, see generally EVAN FOX-DECENT,
SOVEREIGNTY’S PROMISE: THE STATE AS FIDUCIARY (2011); Eyal Benvenisti, Sovereigns as
Trustees of Humanity: On the Accountability of States to Foreign Stakeholders, 107 AM. J. INT’L
L. 295 (2013); Kathleen Clark, Do We Have Enough Ethics in Government Yet?: An Answer From
Fiduciary Theory, 1996 U. ILL. L. REV. 57; Evan J. Criddle, Fiduciary Administration: Rethinking
Popular Representation in Agency Rulemaking, 88 TEX. L. REV. 441 (2010); Evan J. Criddle,
Fiduciary Foundations of Administrative Law, 54 UCLA L. REV. 117 (2006); Paul Finn, Public
Trust and Public Accountability, 3 GRIFFITH L. REV. 224 (1994); Evan Fox-Decent, The Fiduciary
Nature of State Legal Authority, 31 QUEENS L.J. 259 (2005); Sung Hui Kim, The Last Temptation
of Congress: Legislator Insider Trading and the Fiduciary Norm Against Corruption, 98 CORNELL
L. REV. 845 (2013); Gary Lawson, Guy I. Seidman & Robert G. Natelson, The Fiduciary
Foundations of Federal Equal Protection, 94 B.U. L. REV. 415 (2014); Ethan J. Leib & Stephen
R. Galoob, Fiduciary Political Theory: A Critique, 125 YALE L.J. 1820 (2016); Ethan J. Leib,
David L. Ponet & Michael Serota, A Fiduciary Theory of Judging, 101 CALIF. L. REV. 699 (2013);
Geoffrey P. Miller, The Corporate Law Background of the Necessary and Proper Clause, 79 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 1 (2010); Donna M. Nagy, Owning Stock While Making Law: An Agency Problem
and a Fiduciary Solution, 48 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 567 (2013); David L. Ponet & Ethan J. Leib,
Fiduciary Law’s Lessons for Deliberative Democracy, 91 B.U. L. REV. 1249 (2011).
18. See, e.g., Paul B. Miller, Justifying Fiduciary Duties, 58 MCGILL L.J. 969, 980–82 (2013);
cf. Paul B. Miller & Andrew S. Gold, Fiduciary Governance, 57 WM. & MARY L. REV. 513, 517–
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to this classic form of fiduciary duty as an “agent-to-principal duty.” In
direct democracy, however, there is no representative relationship—
no clear principal or agent—to trigger such fiduciary duties. The whole
point of direct democracy is to eliminate the principal–agent problem
inherent in political representation.
At the same time, the Supreme Court in Hollingsworth seemed
too quick to relieve voters of any obligation simply because they did
not meet the requirements of the Restatement (Third) of Agency19—an
oddly narrow criterion given the diversity of fiduciary relationships in
private law. The absence of a principal–agent problem does not
necessarily mean that voters have no duties. In several contexts, private
law imposes duties—which are sometimes confusingly also called
“fiduciary”—on voters outside any representative relationship. For
example, majority shareholders owe duties to the minority when voting
on a corporate freezeout merger.20 Similar duties crop up in votes on
private bond restructurings and oil and gas unitization.21 But these
duties—which I will refer to as “principal-to-principal duties”—are not
aimed at controlling agency costs. They are aimed at a different
governance problem: preventing the majority from oppressing the
minority. And this problem is of particular concern in direct
democracy, which lacks many of the structural features that protect and
empower minorities in representative democracy.
Once we are focused on the right governance problem—the
tyranny of the majority—looking at the principal-to-principal duties
that private law places on voters can help us better understand
approaches to the same type of problem in direct democracy, whether
or not those duties are properly termed “fiduciary.”
Private law recognizes the tension between voters’ rights to
“selfish ownership” and the risk that the majority may use its power
vis-à-vis the minority to opportunistically direct disproportionate

18 (2015) (arguing that fiduciaries may be charged with pursuing “purposes” and not only the
interests of persons).
19. See Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652, 2666–67 (2013) (explaining that the basic
features of an agency relationship were missing).
20. See, e.g., Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 712 (Del. 1983) (concluding that the
merger did not meet the requisite standard of fairness because “[m]aterial information, necessary
to acquaint those shareholders with the bargaining positions of [the merging companies], was
withheld under circumstances amounting to a breach of fiduciary duty”).
21. See, e.g., Hackettstown Nat’l Bank v. D.G. Yuengling Brewing Co., 74 F. 110, 112–14 (2d
Cir. 1896); Trees Oil Co. v. State Corp. Comm’n, 105 P.3d 1269, 1282 (Kan. 2005).
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benefits to itself at the minority’s expense.22 For investors to be willing
to commit their capital to a venture governed by majority rule, there
must be some assurance to those who may find themselves in the
minority that they will not be exploited when they are outvoted. And
that role has largely fallen to courts. Thus we can see an equitable
streak running through diverse areas of private law where courts step
in to enforce duties running from the majority to the minority when
issues are put to a vote, not because of any representative relationship,
but rather as a corollary to the use of voting to overcome a collectiveaction problem.23
But what is the content of these principal-to-principal duties?
Teasing this out is important because courts often use “fiduciary”
language loosely without being precise about the governance problem
they are addressing or the scope of the duty they are imposing. As I
explain below in a novel taxonomy, potential voter duties can be
mapped onto a spectrum ranging from purely self-interested voting to
weak and strong forms of equitable antiexploitation obligations to a
“true” fiduciary duty of loyalty.24 The trend in private law is to stay
away from the poles. Even where parties could have protected
themselves through ex ante contracting, courts are reluctant to stand
aside when the majority acts opportunistically toward the minority. But
on the other end, although courts sometimes use the language of
“fiduciary duty” in describing the majority’s obligations toward the
minority, they do not tend to impose the full brunt of the true fiduciary
duty of loyalty; the majority need not subordinate its own interests to
those of the minority in the way an agent would to a principal. Instead,
courts tend to enforce a good-faith duty not to oppress or exploit the
minority. Although the precise content of this duty may be hard to
specify, the important part is that courts recognize the need to police
for opportunism ex post when the minority is vulnerable to the
majority.

22. E.g., Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc., 353 N.E.2d 657, 663 (Mass. 1976) (“The
majority, concededly, have certain rights to what has been termed ‘selfish ownership’ in the
corporation which should be balanced against the concept of their fiduciary obligation to the
minority.”).
23. I focus primarily on corporate law because it is the area where this case law is most
developed, but courts exhibit a similar institutional response in many areas of private law where
they are tasked with overseeing long-term relational contracting. See John C. Coffee, Jr., The
Mandatory/Enabling Balance in Corporate Law: An Essay on the Judicial Role, 89 COLUM. L.
REV. 1618, 1621 (1989).
24. See infra Part II.B.
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Turning back to public law, the equitable role that private-law
courts play in policing for opportunism when an issue is put to a vote
can be a useful lens for understanding the Supreme Court’s sometimes
puzzling approach to equal protection in direct democracy. As Justice
Thomas recently noted in his dissent in Arizona State Legislature v.
Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission,25 the Court has been
all over the map when it comes to direct democracy, sometimes
“offer[ing] a paean to the ballot initiative” and other times treating
ballot initiatives with “disdain.”26 But perhaps private law can be a
guide for understanding (and evaluating) the intuition behind the
Court’s approach to direct democracy in cases ranging from Romer v.
Evans,27 which struck down a ballot initiative barring claims of
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, to Schuette, which
upheld an initiative banning affirmative action.28
The Court does not seem to treat voters as fiduciaries in the classic
sense when it reviews the output of ballot initiatives; it does not require
the majority to put the minority’s interests ahead of its own. But it does
not seem to take a hands-off, no-duty approach either. Instead, the
Court may be filling the same institutional role in reviewing the output
of direct democracy as the courts play in reviewing votes in private
law—policing for minority exploitation and acting as an equitable
brake on majoritarian excess where the structural protections for the
minority are weakest.
Part I of this Article explores the governance problem in direct
democracy. Although direct democracy eliminates the principal–agent
problem—the primary justification for fiduciary duties in private law—
by allowing voters to make law directly, it leaves minorities particularly
vulnerable to exploitation. Part II then looks at the duties of voters in
private law, with a particular focus on the relationship between
majorities and minorities in closely held corporations, and maps
potential voter duties onto a spectrum. As I explain below, the law
governing closely held corporations is a useful lens for analyzing
minority vulnerability in direct democracy because several structural
features of direct democracy are—perhaps surprisingly—more
analogous to closely held corporations than publicly traded ones. Part

25. Ariz. State Legislature v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 135 S. Ct. 2652 (2015).
26. Id. at 2697 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
27. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
28. Schuette v. Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action, Integration & Immigrant Rights & Fight
for Equal. by Any Means Necessary (BAMN), 134 S. Ct. 1623, 1639 (2014) (plurality opinion).
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III turns back to public law and uses these private-law approaches to
try to better understand the intuitions behind the Supreme Court’s
approach to equal protection in direct democracy. Part IV addresses
some potential objections and disanalogies.
I. THE GOVERNANCE PROBLEM IN DIRECT DEMOCRACY
James Madison identified two governance challenges for any
democracy: First, it must control the “mischiefs of faction”; that is, it
must prevent a majority of the people from ganging up on the minority
and opportunistically directing benefits to themselves at the minority’s
expense.29 Second, it must ensure the loyalty of the rulers to those they
rule; in other words, it must address the principal–agent problem that
arises when the representatives who are chosen to govern might pursue
their own interests instead of the interests of the people who put them
in office (let alone the ones who voted against them).30 In direct
democracy, the second concern is inapplicable—there are no
representatives31—but, as Madison warned in Federalist 10, the first
concern about the tyranny of the majority is acute.
A. Voters Are Principals, Not Agents
In contrast to the Supreme Court’s apparent position that voters
have no fiduciary duties in ballot initiatives, some scholars have argued
that direct-democracy voters owe fiduciary or fiduciary-like duties to
the public when they vote. As the following discussion indicates,
however, the duties that these scholars advocate are designed to
combat a principal–agent problem and do not fit well when applied to
direct-democracy voters, who are not agents, but principals.
For example, Professors Michael Serota and Ethan Leib argue
that voters in ballot initiatives (though not candidate elections) act in
a “representative” capacity because the product of their vote is

29. THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 58 (James Madison) (Jacob Ernest Cooke, ed., 1982).
30. THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 350–51 (James Madison).
31. Indeed, direct democracy can actually be an effective tool for dealing with problems of
incumbent self-dealing in representative democracy. One need not look further than states like
California and Arizona’s use of ballot initiatives to take the task of drawing legislative districts
out of the hands of the legislators who will run for reelection in those districts. See Rave, supra
note 13, at 730–35; see also Ariz. State Legislature v. Ariz. Indep. Redstricting Comm’n, 135 S.
Ct. 2652, 2675–77 (2015) (upholding an independent redistricting commission created by ballot
initiative).
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coercive law that binds other citizens.32 Accordingly, Serota and Leib
say, voters in direct democracy bear a duty “to pursue vigorously the
interests of the represented and refuse to self-deal”—an agent-toprincipal duty that sounds almost fiduciary in nature.33 Although they
are careful to limit their claim to a moral obligation, not a legally
enforceable one, they would require direct-democracy voters to vote
in pursuit of a credible and good-faith conception of the public interest,
not their own private interests.34
Professor Edward Foley goes even further. He argues that voters
are in fact fiduciaries, not only in direct democracy, but in all
elections.35 Foley claims that voters “represent, not themselves, but the
totality of residents in their community,”36 and thus bear a fiduciary
duty to act “on behalf of society as a whole, both now and into the
future”37 when they make law directly through ballot initiatives and
also when they elect legislators to make law.38
Foley and Serota and Leib derive their duties from directdemocracy voters’ position in a “structural relationship of political
representation” and, in doing so, describe duties that are aimed at
solving a principal–agent problem.39 But it is difficult to see whom
voters represent when they vote in a plebiscite (let alone in a candidate
election where the voters are deciding who should represent them).
When citizens can vote directly on a particular issue (instead of
delegating that task to legislators), it is not clear how voters act on
behalf of or “represent” anyone but themselves. In other words, there
is no obvious principal or agent.
Serota and Leib suggest that voters act on behalf of nonvoters—
“the too-young, too-infirm, too-lazy, and too-felonious”40—but that

32. Serota & Leib, supra note 14, at 1596–98, 1603–11; see also id. at 1611 n.53 (equating
“voters acting in direct democracy” with “[agents] acting on behalf of others”).
33. Id. at 1611. Serota and Leib have elsewhere described the requirements of the fiduciary
duty of loyalty as follows: “The fiduciary is prohibited from self-dealing and is required to pursue
the interests of her beneficiary above her own.” Ethan J. Leib, Michael Serota & David L. Ponet,
Fiduciary Principles and the Jury, 55 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1109, 1135 (2014).
34. Serota & Leib, supra note 14, at 1598, 1612–13.
35. Foley, supra note 14, at 153, 160–63.
36. Id. at 153.
37. Id. at 183.
38. Id. at 157–58, 162–63, 175–82.
39. Serota & Leib, supra note 14, at 1605; see Foley, supra note 14, at 158 n.16.
40. Serota & Leib, supra note 14, at 1605. Children may present a special case, and it is not
implausible to think that they are virtually represented by citizens who are old enough to vote.
But very often children will have actual representatives—their parents—who act as recognized
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idea seems quite close to discarded notions of virtual representation
(that is, that white male property owners acted on behalf of nonvoting
women, slaves, and tenants). “[M]ore important[ly],” Serota and Leib
argue, “the winners must represent the losers.”41 But on a fundamental
level, it is difficult to see how such a form of representation could work
in a plebiscite, where a single issue is put to a one-time vote. The
interests of the winners and losers on that issue and at that moment are
diametrically opposed. How could the winners faithfully represent the
losers in the very act of expressing their opposing interests through
voting?42
Foley is not precise on the issue of whom voters are supposed to
represent. At times he suggests that it is “the totality of residents in
their community,”43 and at other times it is “society as a whole, present
and future.”44 But simply defining the beneficiary of voters’ fiduciary
duties as “society as a whole” cannot solve the problem. Unless

(though perhaps sui generis) fiduciaries on their behalf and accordingly should take their interests
into account when voting. See, e.g., Elizabeth S. Scott & Robert E. Scott, Parents as Fiduciaries,
81 VA. L. REV. 2401, 2401–03 (1995).
41. Serota & Leib, supra note 14, at 1605.
42. This issue has been well ventilated in class action law. The same type of problem arises
when one plaintiff seeks to represent a larger class, but we worry that a collective choice (for
example, to accept a group settlement) will be imposed upon class members with divergent
interests in a single-shot transaction. Class action law solves this problem, not by saying that class
members with one set of interests represent those with divergent interests, but by defining the
class such that interests are aligned class-wide. See, e.g., Amchem Prods. Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S.
591, 625–26 (1997); Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 40–42 (1940). Such an alignment is not an
option in a plebiscite. Madison recognized as much in Federalist 10. He said that one way to cure
the mischiefs of faction would be to give everyone the same interests; but that, of course, is
impossible in a polity. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, supra note 29, at 58 (James Madison).
43. Foley, supra note 14, at 153.
44. Id. at 162–63, 188. This imprecision leads to confusion when Foley talks about the
implications of his voters-as-fiduciaries approach for the issue the Supreme Court considered in
Evenwel v. Abbott, 136 S. Ct. 1120 (2016): whether legislative districts should be drawn to equalize
total population or number of voters. Foley, supra note 14, at 187–90. If voters represent “the
totality of residents in their community,” id. at 153, then districting by total population (Foley’s
preferred course) makes sense. Each resident will have equal “say” in the legislature through his
or her (virtual) representatives—the fiduciary voters. If, on the other hand, voters represent
“society as a whole,” id. at 162–63, then geographical districting does not matter because voters
will have no allegiance to their districts. If we are going to have districts, then it actually seems
like they should be drawn to equalize voters, not population, so that all voters will have an equal
chance to exercise their fiduciary obligation to get their view of the public good enacted and to
take maximum advantage of “crowdsourcing” (that is, the Condorcet Jury Theorem) in
determining what that good is. Cf. id. at 179–80. The Court in Evenwel ultimately decided that
states are permitted to draw districts to equalize total population without deciding whether that
is the only permissible basis for apportionment. See Evenwel, 136 S. Ct. at 1132–33.

RAVE IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

342

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

10/26/2016 10:16 PM

[Vol. 66:331

interests are uniform across society, there will always be winners and
losers in a vote.
Perhaps more importantly, the types of duties these scholars
describe are aimed at a principal–agent problem and are not well suited
to the act of voting among principals. The core of this classic form of
fiduciary duty (the agent-to-principal duty) is the duty of loyalty, which
requires the fiduciary to act for the exclusive benefit of the
beneficiary—to put the beneficiary’s interests ahead of his own.45 But
the law does not trust the fiduciary to do that when his own interests
are at stake, so fiduciary law adopts a prophylactic rule against selfdealing: the fiduciary must avoid situations where his interests conflict
with the beneficiary’s (or be prepared to defend the fairness of the
dealing before a skeptical court).46 The point is to eliminate, or at least
minimize, situations where the interests of the fiduciary diverge from
the interests of the beneficiary—to maximize the agent’s faithfulness
to the principal he represents.
These agent-to-principal fiduciary duties do not fit well in the
absence of any obvious representative relationship. They are designed
to regulate the relationship between principals and agents, not
interactions among voters, who are all principals themselves. Thus
their tools make little sense in the voting context, where the sorts of
conflicts of interest that those prophylactic rules are designed to
prevent are inherent. Trying to impose a true fiduciary duty of loyalty
on voters would be to ask them to act selflessly in the very type of
situation where fiduciary law does not trust fiduciaries.
The Supreme Court was right in Hollingsworth: voters are not
agents of the people. But that does not necessarily mean that directdemocracy voters have no duties. It simply means that the discussion
of direct-democracy voters’ duties to date has focused on the wrong
governance problem. The governance problem in direct democracy is
not a principal–agent problem that can be addressed through a
conventional fiduciary duty of loyalty. Instead, it is a tyranny-of-themajority problem.

45. See, e.g., Victor Brudney, Contract and Fiduciary Duty in Corporate Law, 38 B.C. L. REV.
595, 601–02 (1997); Miller, supra note 18, at 976.
46. See, e.g., Birnbaum v. Birnbaum, 539 N.E.2d 574, 576 (N.Y. 1989) (“[A] fiduciary owes a
duty of undivided and undiluted loyalty to those whose interests the fiduciary is to protect . . . .
[This] requir[es] avoidance of situations in which a fiduciary’s personal interest possibly conflicts
with the interest of those owed a fiduciary duty.” (citations omitted)).
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B. The Plight of the Minority
Direct democracy is ripe for minority exploitation because it lacks
many of the structural protections for minorities that are built into a
representative democracy (about which Madison waxed so eloquently
in Federalist 10).47 At least four features of representative democracy
that minorities depend on for protection are lacking in direct
democracy: intermediation, veto points, deliberation, and repeat play.
First, minorities cannot depend on the intermediation of
representatives with (even judicially unenforced) fiduciary duties
running to the polity as a whole.48 In a ballot initiative, there is no
opportunity, in Madison’s words, “to refine and enlarge the public
views by passing them through the medium of a chosen body of
citizens, whose wisdom may best discern the true interest of their
country and whose patriotism and love of justice will be least likely to
sacrifice it to temporary or partial considerations.”49 Instead the voters
act directly.
Second, direct democracy lacks the various veto points that a
system of divided power creates (such as bicameralism, the presidential
veto, federalism, and the filibuster), which can sometimes give
minorities effective control, or at least significant leverage, over a
decision.50 A minority group need only control one of these levers to
block, or extract concessions for, disadvantageous legislation, even if it
47. See, e.g., Derrick A. Bell, Jr., The Referendum: Democracy’s Barrier to Racial Equality,
54 WASH. L. REV. 1, 13–15 (1978); Erwin Chemerinsky, Challenging Direct Democracy, 2007
MICH. ST. L. REV. 293, 295–97; Julian N. Eule, Judicial Review of Direct Democracy, 99 YALE
L.J. 1503, 1522–30 (1990); see also Schuette v. Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action, Integration &
Immigrant Rights & Fight for Equal. by Any Means Necessary (BAMN), 134 S. Ct. 1623, 1651
(2013) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (“[W]ithout checks, democratically approved legislation can
oppress minority groups.”). Political scientists have demonstrated that racial, ethnic, and sexual
minorities have fared poorly in direct democracy. See, e.g., Todd Donovan, Direct Democracy and
Campaigns Against Minorities, 97 MINN. L. REV. 1730, 1743–45 (2013); Barbara S. Gamble,
Putting Civil Rights to a Popular Vote, 41 AM. J. POL. SCI. 245, 262 (1997); Donald P. HaiderMarkel, Alana Querze & Kara Lindaman, Lose, Win, or Draw?: A Reexamination of Direct
Democracy and Minority Rights, 60 POL. RES. Q. 304, 307 (2007); cf. Todd Donovan & Shaun
Bowler, Direct Democracy and Minority Rights: An Extension, 42 AM. J. POL. SCI. 1020, 1023–24
(1998) (arguing that minority oppression stemming from direct democracy is more prevalent in
smaller jurisdictions and may go away as size increases). But see Zoltan L. Hajnal, Elisabeth R.
Gerber & Hugh Louch, Minorities and Direct Legislation: Evidence from California Ballot
Proposition Elections, 64 J. POL. 154, 169–70 (2002) (finding that minorities are usually on the
winning side of initiatives, except when those initiatives explicitly target minority rights).
48. See Eule, supra note 47, at 1526–27; Rave, supra note 13, at 706–22 (arguing that political
representatives owe a fiduciary duty of loyalty to voters, though it often goes unenforced).
49. THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, supra note 29, at 62 (James Madison).
50. See Bell, supra note 47, at 14; Eule, supra note 47, at 1557–58.
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does not have the votes to run the same gauntlet with its own policies.
In a ballot initiative, by contrast, a bare majority wins.
Third, in modern ballot initiatives, there is less opportunity for the
minority to persuade the majority through deliberation.51 After all, the
voters cannot all get together in a room to discuss the issue before the
vote.52 And the quality of mass discourse, through advertising and
sound bites aimed at harried voters with many other things on their
minds, can leave much to be desired from a deliberative standpoint. As
Professor Lawrence Sager put it, “Legislation by plebiscite is not and
cannot be a deliberative process.”53
Fourth—and perhaps most importantly—votes on ballot
initiatives are single-shot transactions, so minorities cannot protect
themselves through logrolling or coalition building.54 Without repeat
play, minorities cannot trade their support on a number of broader
measures toward which they are relatively indifferent for others’
support on the few issues that are most critical to the minority.
Effective vote trading requires a series of votes over time among repeat
players with the opportunity to build up enough trust to be confident
that the counterparties will be there when the time comes and to punish
them later if they defect. In that sort of environment (for example, in a
legislature), a cohesive minority can do quite well by building up
political capital through bargains and spending it to make sure its most
critical issues are taken care of.55 A plebiscite, by contrast, is just a onetime, up-or-down vote on a single issue.
51. See Eule, supra note 47, at 1527 (“In contrast [to direct democracy], the deliberative
process offers time for reflection, exposure to competing needs, and occasions for transforming
preferences.”); Ethan J. Leib, Can Direct Democracy Be Made Deliberative?, 54 BUFF. L. REV.
903, 911 (2006) (“[D]irect democracy’s reliance on ‘naked’ preferences is potentially troublesome
because it makes little effort to educate citizens on the issues upon which they are voting and
gives them no well-suited forum to deliberate about those issues.”).
52. The same might not have been true of ancient Greek city-states or New England town
meetings.
53. Lawrence Gene Sager, Insular Majorities Unabated: Warth v. Seldin and City of Eastlake
v. Forest City Enterprises, Inc., 91 HARV. L. REV. 1373, 1414 (1978). But see Leib, supra note 51,
at 914 (laying out a proposal for making direct democracy more deliberative through a “popular
branch of government”).
54. See Eule, supra note 47, at 1527, 1556–58; Clayton P. Gillette, Expropriation and
Institutional Design in State and Local Government Law, 80 VA. L. REV. 625, 636, 667–68 (1994).
55. This is a central insight of public-choice theory. See generally JAMES M. BUCHANAN &
GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT: LOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF
CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY 213–16, 220–22 (1962). Note that there is no guarantee that
minorities will do better in representative democracy, though public-choice theory tends to
predict that they will. See, e.g., Bruce A. Ackerman, Beyond Carolene Products, 98 HARV. L.
REV. 713, 723–24 (1985). Minorities may be the victims of majority logrolls and even with repeat
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Further, state laws regulating direct democracy have certain
features that exacerbate the risk of minority exploitation. Singlesubject rules prevent even less effective attempts at logrolling.56 In
theory, even without repeat play, one minority group could cut a deal
with others to combine unrelated issues into a single omnibus ballot
initiative, which could pass with their combined support.57 But the laws
of most states take away even this more limited opportunity for
logrolling by restricting ballot initiatives to a single subject.58 And this
focus on a single issue may also serve to create cohesion among a
majority faction even when its preferences on that particular issue are
not strongly held.
Similarly, the use of secret ballots in direct democracy makes it
difficult to monitor or enforce any sort of political bargain over time;
voters cannot punish each other for defecting.59 And, knowing that
their votes are secret, voters may feel freer to vote on their baser
impulses.60 At the same time, voters in direct democracy often lack
adequate information or signals from moderating intermediaries like
political parties on the issues they are asked to decide, and they, quite
rationally, fail to invest in obtaining that information.61
Finally, the minority typically lacks an easy exit option.62 Unlike,
say, minority shareholders in a publicly traded corporation, voters
dissatisfied with the outcome of a ballot initiative cannot simply sell
their shares. Their only choice is to pick up and move. Although some

play might not have enough political capital to trade to protect their interests. See Michael D.
Gilbert, Single Subject Rules and the Legislative Process, 67 U. PITT. L. REV. 803, 835–36 (2006).
And discrete and insular minorities might be unable to find allies due to irrational prejudice. See
United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938); JOHN HART ELY,
DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 103 (1980). But minorities are
undoubtedly more vulnerable in direct democracy, where bargaining is not possible.
56. See Gilbert, supra note 55, at 858; Daniel Hays Lowenstein, California Initiatives and the
Single-Subject Rule, 30 UCLA L. REV. 936, 957–59 (1983).
57. See Cooter & Gilbert, supra note 8, at 700.
58. See id. at 689. Cooter and Gilbert caution that this form of logrolling through omnibus
ballot initiatives can be even more harmful to minorities who have no opportunity to bargain with
the majority not to pass it, no matter how much harm it does to them. Id. at 689, 700 n.60.
59. See id. at 701–03.
60. See, e.g., Bell, supra note 47, at 14–15; Eule, supra note 47, at 1556.
61. See, e.g., Eule, supra note 47, at 1557; Jonathan R. Macey, The Role of the Democratic
and Republican Parties as Organizers of Shadow Interest Groups, 89 MICH. L. REV. 1, 23–24
(1990). For a discussion of the role of intermediary institutions, see Samuel Issacharoff & Daniel
R. Ortiz, Governing Through Intermediaries, 85 VA. L. REV. 1627 (1999).
62. See ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY: RESPONSES TO DECLINE IN
FIRMS, ORGANIZATIONS, AND STATES 17 (1970).
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degree of sorting is, of course, possible as people move to localities
where neighbors share their preferences,63 moving to a different
jurisdiction may entail significant costs that the minority is unwilling or
unable to bear.64 In short, the minority is very vulnerable to the
majority.
This is not to say that the vulnerability of minorities makes direct
democracy an anathema. The whole point is that it is a majoritarian
institution.65 Direct democracy empowers the majority to break the
hold of powerful cohesive minorities that might capture the legislative
process. And it can serve as an important check on unfaithful agents
who may manage to ignore the majority will by either catering to
powerful minorities in a series of bargains that are obscured to the
voters66 or, worse, manipulating the laws governing the political
process to entrench themselves.67 It was only through the ballot
initiative, for example, that voters in California and Arizona were able
to limit gerrymandering by taking the power to draw legislative

63. See William A. Fischel, Public Goods and Property Rights: Of Coase, Tiebout, and Just
Compensation, in PROPERTY RIGHTS: COOPERATION, CONFLICT, AND LAW 343, 347–48 (Terry
L. Anderson & Fred S. McChesney eds., 2003); Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local
Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416, 419 (1956).
64. See, e.g., David Hume, Of the Original Contract, in SOCIAL CONTRACT: ESSAYS BY
LOCKE, HUME, AND ROUSSEAU 147, 156 (Oxford Univ. Press 1962) (1748) (“Can we seriously
say, that a poor peasant or artisan has a free choice to leave his country, when he knows no foreign
language or manners, and lives, from day to day, by the small wages which he acquires?”).
65. Cooter & Gilbert, supra note 57, at 702 (“A primary purpose of direct democracy is to
ascertain the [majority] will of the people.”); see also Lynn A. Baker, Direct Democracy and
Discrimination: A Public Choice Perspective, 67 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 707, 712 (1992) (“By
definition, a minority group will not itself have enough plebiscite votes either to pass laws that
would advantage it or to stop legislation that would disadvantage it.”).
66. See Cooter & Gilbert, supra note 57, at 699; cf. Kellen Zale, Changing the Plan: The
Challenge of Applying Environmental Review to Land Use Initiatives, 40 ECOLOGY L.Q. 833, 866–
67 (2013) (discussing how land-use initiatives can serve as a structural counterbalance to
prodevelopment special interests in cities).
67. See, e.g., Samuel Issacharoff & Richard H. Pildes, Politics as Markets: Partisan Lockups
of the Democratic Process, 50 STAN. L. REV. 643, 712 (1998); see also BRUCE E. CAIN,
DEMOCRACY MORE OR LESS: AMERICA’S POLITICAL REFORM QUANDARY 25–29 (2015)
(discussing the value of pluralism in political mechanisms and reform). Even Professor Bruce
Cain, who is generally skeptical of direct democracy where it can trump the legislature through
constitutional amendments, explains that “if the direct popular initiative is to have a role, it should
be limited to reforms where elected official[s] have a conflict of interest and decided by
supermajority rules.” CAIN, supra, at 210.
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districts out of the hands of self-interested incumbent legislators and
creating independent redistricting commissions.68
Madison’s governance concerns are interrelated, and there is an
inherent tradeoff in choosing direct or representative democracy. The
structural features of the legislative process designed to protect
minorities also enable minorities to capture the process and insulate
representatives from accountability to the majority. And the features
of direct democracy that can break this stranglehold come at a risk to
minorities, who have no opportunity to bargain and logroll to protect
their interests.
II. FIDUCIARY(?) DUTIES OF VOTERS IN PRIVATE LAW
Several areas of private law recognize that minorities are
vulnerable when decisions are put to a vote. In corporate law, for
example, there is a strong norm of majority rule.69 Yet corporate law
recognizes a tension between the rights of majority shareholders to
pursue its own selfish interests70 and the risk that the majority will use
their control over corporate affairs to gain disproportionate benefits at
the expense of the minority.71 And in some circumstances, corporate
law recognizes a duty running from the majority to the minority—a
principal-to-principal duty. For example, a majority shareholder with
the ability to control the outcome of a shareholder vote cannot use a
merger, sale of assets, dissolution, or reverse stock split to “squeeze
out” the minority for less than the fair value of its shares.72

68. ARIZ. CONST. art. IV, pt. 2, § 1 (amended by Ariz. Proposition 106 (2000)); CAL. CONST.
art. XXI (amended by Cal. Proposition 11 (2008) and Cal. Proposition 20 (2010)); see also Rave,
supra note 13, at 730–32 (discussing the Arizona and California commissions).
69. See DOUGLAS K. MOLL & ROBERT A. RAGAZZO, CLOSELY HELD CORPORATIONS
§ 7.01[B][1], Lexis Advance (database updated 2015).
70. E.g., Thorpe v. CERBCO, Inc., 676 A.2d 436, 437, 444 (Del. 1996) (noting that the
controlling shareholders “were entitled to pursue their own interests in voting their shares” and
acknowledging “their entitlement as shareholders to act in their self-interest”); see also Ringling
Bros.–Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows v. Ringling, 53 A.2d 441, 447 (Del. 1947) (“Generally
speaking, a shareholder may exercise wide liberality of judgment in the matter of voting, and it is
not objectionable that his motives may be for personal profit, or determined by whims or
caprice . . . .”); Jedwab v. MGM Grand Hotels, Inc., 509 A.2d 584, 598 (Del. Ch. 1986) (observing
that the law “does not . . . require . . . controlling shareholders [to] sacrifice their own financial
interest in the enterprise for the sake of the corporation or its minority shareholders”).
71. Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc., 353 N.E.2d 657, 663 (Mass. 1976).
72. See, e.g., Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 703 (Del. 1983); Coggins v. New
England Patriots Football Club, Inc., 492 N.E.2d 1112, 1117–18 (Mass. 1986); Grato v. Grato, 639
A.2d 390, 397–98 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1994).
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Likewise, in partnerships, most day-to-day decisions are governed
by majority rule.73 But that arrangement leaves minority partners
vulnerable, particularly given that partners (unlike corporate
shareholders) are not protected by limited liability; they are personally
responsible for all partnership debts incurred at the majority’s
direction.74 As a result, partners are fiduciaries, not only for the
partnership, but also for each other, and are required at all times to act
in good faith toward each other.75
Courts have recognized similar principal-to-principal duties when
a majority of bondholders vote under a collective-action clause to
“cram down” a debt-restructuring plan over the objection of a
minority.76 In order to facilitate restructuring when a debtor becomes
insolvent (which could leave both debtor and creditors better off than
a default), some bond contracts allow a majority of bondholders to
agree to postpone payments or reduce the principal on all of the bonds,
even those held by dissenters, thereby reducing the likelihood of
holdouts wrecking the deal. But because of the risk that the majority
will collude with the debtor to direct disproportionate benefits to itself
at the minority’s expense, courts have conditioned enforcement of
these clauses on the majority’s compliance with an intercreditor duty
of “utmost good faith.”77
We can see a similar move in compulsory oil and gas unitization,
where property owners can be compelled by majority vote to
participate in joint operations to extract oil and gas from a common
reservoir in the hopes of reducing waste and increasing total
production.78 But enforcement of the unitization plan is conditioned on

73. E.g., UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 401(j) (NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE
LAWS 1997).
74. Id. § 306(a).
75. E.g., Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928); see also UNIF. P’SHIP ACT,
supra note 73, § 404(a)–(d) (listing partners’ duties).
76. William W. Bratton & G. Mitu Gulati, Sovereign Debt Reform and the Best Interest of
Creditors, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1, 70–71 (2004); Lee C. Buchheit & G. Mitu Gulati, Sovereign Bonds
and the Collective Will, 51 EMORY L.J. 1317, 1336–37 (2002).
77. Hackettstown Nat’l Bank v. D.G. Yuengling Brewing Co., 74 F. 110, 113 (2d Cir. 1896);
see, e.g., Sage v. Cent. R.R. Co., 99 U.S. 334, 341 (1879); Redwood Master Fund Ltd. v. TD Bank
Eur. Ltd. [2002] EWHC (Ch) 2703, [105] (Eng.). For a more detailed discussion, see D. Theodore
Rave, Governing the Anticommons in Aggregate Litigation, 66 VAND. L. REV. 1183, 1235–38
(2013).
78. Gary D. Libecap & James L. Smith, The Economic Evolution of Petroleum Property
Rights in the United States, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 589, 596 (2002).

RAVE IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

2016]

FIDUCIARY VOTERS?

10/26/2016 10:16 PM

349

the good faith of the majority and fair and equitable treatment of the
minority in allocating the proceeds from the joint operation.79
In short, there is an equitable streak running through diverse areas
of private law requiring the majority to treat the minority “fairly” when
an issue is put to a vote. The majority’s principal-to-principal duty is
sometimes called “fiduciary,”80 but its justification differs from the
agent-to-principal duty in quintessentially fiduciary relationships.
A. The Source of Private-Law Voter Duties
“True” fiduciary duties, like the duty of loyalty, are a tool (one of
many) to control agency costs in principal–agent relationships.81 The
duty of loyalty requires the fiduciary to subordinate his or her interests
to the beneficiary’s, and it is typically enforced through prophylactic
rules against self-dealing.82 But the majority’s duty in the examples
above is not aimed at aligning the interests of the majority with those
of the minority and ensuring that the majority faithfully executes the
minority’s wishes. In other words, it is not aimed at a principal–agent
problem.
Instead, the majority’s duty is a corollary to the use of voting to
solve a collective-action problem. Running a corporation, a
partnership, or even a debt restructuring by unanimous consent leaves
the collective vulnerable to strategic holdouts, who can threaten to
block beneficial actions unless they are paid off. Adopting a majority
voting rule disables would-be holdouts, but, at the same time, it leaves
the minority vulnerable to the majority. After all, the power to hold
out is the power to avoid exploitation.83
This is a distinct governance problem. By placing principal-toprincipal duties on majority voters, the law aims to reassure individuals
who, in search of joint gains, surrender their autonomy to joint

79. E.g., Trees Oil Co. v. State Corp. Comm’n, 105 P.3d 1269, 1282 (Kan. 2005) (recognizing
a state law requiring courts to ensure “that the [compulsory unitization] is fair and equitable to
all interest owners.” (citing KAN. STAT. ANN. § 55-1304(c) (2003))).
80. See, e.g., Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 306 (1939) (“A director is a fiduciary. So is a
dominant or controlling stockholder or group of stockholders.” (citations omitted)); Perlman v.
Feldmann, 219 F.2d 173, 175 (2d Cir. 1955); see also MOLL & RAGAZZO, supra note 69, § 6.07[A]
(“[T]he duties owed by a controlling shareholder are typically characterized as ‘fiduciary’ in
nature . . . .”).
81. See, e.g., Miller, supra note 18, at 981.
82. See id. at 983 (“In fiduciary law . . . it is assumed that the parties are interacting for the
exclusive benefit of . . . the beneficiary.”); Miller & Gold, supra note 18, at 547.
83. See Rave, supra note 77, at 1213–19.
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decisionmaking processes that they will not be exploited if they are
outvoted.84 The majority’s duty is what the minority demands in
exchange for leaving itself vulnerable to a majority vote. It is the
minority’s assurance against a tyranny of the majority. Indeed, as
Professor John Coffee has explained, as corporate law shifted away
from unanimity requirements for fundamental corporate changes in
the nineteenth century and toward majority rule, shareholders’ ability
to protect themselves from exploitation by holding out “was replaced
by the idea that those controlling the corporation owed a duty of
fairness to the minority.”85
The source of this duty is thus fundamentally contractarian. As
one court put it in the corporate context, there is an implicit term in the
corporate contract “that corporate machinery may not be manipulated
so as to injure minority stockholders.”86 But because the costs of
contractual specificity are high—it is hard at the time the cooperative
venture is formed to anticipate all of the creative means by which the
majority might take advantage of the minority—the law supplies
default terms.87
Courts play an important institutional role in this story. When the
voters’ “social contract” (for example, the corporate charter,
partnership agreement, or bond contract) is incomplete, it effectively
delegates to courts the role of policing for opportunism. Indeed, as
Coffee has argued, what matters most in corporate law “is not the
specific substantive content of any rule, but rather the institution of
84. See id. at 1215–19, 1234.
85. Coffee, supra note 23, at 1635. The dissenting shareholder’s right of appraisal, which,
under certain circumstances, allows shareholders to force the corporation to buy back their shares
at a judicially determined “fair value,” also arose in response to minority vulnerability when state
legislatures amended the rules to allow fundamental corporate changes to go forward on less than
unanimous consent. See, e.g., Voeller v. Neilston Warehouse Co., 311 U.S. 531, 535–36 (1941)
(recounting the history of the Ohio statute); William J. Carney, Fundamental Corporate Changes,
Minority Shareholders, and Business Purposes, 1980 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 69, 81–82 (recounting
shifts in American law).
86. Condec Corp. v. Lunkenheimer Co., 230 A.2d 769, 775 (Del. Ch. 1967).
87. See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Close Corporations and Agency Costs,
38 STAN. L. REV. 271, 283 (1986) [hereinafter Easterbrook & Fischel, Close Corporations]; cf.
Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Contract and Fiduciary Duty, 36 J.L. & ECON. 425,
445 (1993) (explaining how establishing default rules can reduce transaction costs). Even if private
parties can contract around default rules imposing duties on the majority, the content of those
default rules tells us something important. Presumably the default rules are set to reflect the terms
to which most parties would agree most of the time (thus minimizing transaction costs because
few parties would want to depart from them). See Victor Brudney, Equal Treatment of
Shareholders in Corporate Distributions and Reorganizations, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 1072, 1087–88
(1983). Thus they are the implicit terms of a contract when the contract is silent on those points.
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judicial oversight.”88 Coffee explains that in any form of long-term
relational contracting (such as a corporation) the parties know that
disagreements will inevitably arise.89 Seeing as they cannot possibly
anticipate and provide for all of them in advance, they specify a
governance mechanism to resolve future disputes, subject to some
judicial oversight ex post.90 The hope, of course, is that the governance
mechanism (whether it is majority rule, board authority, or something
else) will determine the best course of action; it is not always clear what
is in the collective interest, and courts are not necessarily the best
institutions to figure it out.91 But any governance mechanism has its
weaknesses, and corporate law critically depends on courts ex post to
ensure that all parties continue to act in good faith, not
opportunistically, when using that mechanism.92 Courts recognize this
intuitively.93 Thus it is no surprise that, across a broad range of privatelaw contexts where voting is used to resolve disagreements and
facilitate collective action, courts recognize that voters have some
duties to their fellow voters, and step in to prevent one side “from
taking ‘opportunistic’ advantage of the other.”94
B. The Content of Private-Law Voter Duties
It is clear that voters in the majority owe some sort of duty to the
minority across a wide range of private-law contexts. But what is the
content of this duty? Unfortunately, this area is plagued by linguistic
imprecision that can conflate the tyranny-of-the-majority problem with
the principal–agent problem. Courts often use “fiduciary” language
loosely and are not always clear about which of the two governance

88. Coffee, supra note 23, at 1621.
89. Id. at 1681.
90. Id.
91. This relative lack of institutional competence is a motivation for the business judgment
rule. See AC Acquisitions Corp. v. Anderson, Clayton & Co., 519 A.2d 103, 111 (Del. Ch. 1986);
D. Theodore Rave, Institutional Competence in Fiduciary Government, in RESEARCH
HANDBOOK ON FIDUCIARY LAW (Andrew S. Gold & D. Gordon Smith eds.) (forthcoming 2017)
(manuscript at 5–6) (on file with the Duke Law Journal).
92. Coffee, supra note 23, at 1621, 1681.
93. Even in limited liabilities companies (LLCs), which allow far more flexibility for parties
to contract around default rules (even the duty of loyalty), courts see a role for themselves
policing for opportunism ex post. See, e.g., Allentown Ambassadors, Inc. v. Ne. Am. Baseball,
Inc. (In re Allentown Ambassadors, Inc.), 361 B.R. 422, 461–62 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2007); VGS, Inc.
v. Castiel, No. C.A. 17995, 2000 WL 1277372, at *4 (Del. Ch. Aug. 31, 2000); Anderson v. Wilder,
No. E2003-00460-COA-R3-CV, 2003 WL 22768666, at *4 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 21, 2003).
94. Coffee, supra note 23, at 1621.
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problems they are addressing. In what follows, I attempt to tease out
what courts mean when they impose duties on voters. For simplicity’s
sake I focus on examples from corporate law (particularly cases
involving closely held corporations), but the analytical framework
could be applied to other areas of law as well.
We might think of the possibilities for voter duties along a
spectrum:
(1) No Duty: The voter is free to act in his or her own selfinterest regardless of the consequences to others.
(2) Kaldor-Hicks: The voter must act in the best interests of
the collective, regardless of how the benefits and burdens
are distributed.
(3) Pareto: The voter may act in his or her own interest, but
must refrain from harming the minority.
(4) True Loyalty: The voter must subordinate his or her own
interests to those of the minority.
The spectrum is shown in Figure 1 below.
Figure 1: Potential Voter Duties Spectrum
No Duty

Kaldor-Hicks

Pareto

True Loyalty

1. No Duty. At the purely liberal end of the spectrum, voters bear
no duties to others. They are free to act in their own self-interest
without regard to the consequences that a vote may have upon others.
Courts, accordingly, would take a hands-off approach with respect to
the actions of the majority, recognizing their right to selfish ownership.
Minority investors must protect themselves ex ante through
contractual provisions, and courts will not step in to save them if they
fail to bargain for sufficient protections.
Despite academic calls to respect private ordering,95 as the
examples discussed above demonstrate, courts have shown some

95. See, e.g., FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC
STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 243–52 (1991).
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reluctance to take a hands-off approach when majorities use their
superior voting power to take advantage of minorities.96
Corporate law comes closest to this no-duty pole in the context of
publicly traded corporations, where exit is easy. In a publicly traded
corporation, dissatisfied minority shareholders can readily sell their
shares on the market, and thus have the ability to protect themselves.
And the threat of exit acts as an alternative governance mechanism for
disciplining the majority (which is often sensitive to the market price
for stock).97 For this reason, courts are typically more deferential to
what might look like opportunistic actions by the majority when the
minority can easily protect itself through exit.98 Thus in publicly traded
corporations, most states do not afford the minority appraisal rights or
impose duties as strict as those borne by majority shareholders in
closely held corporations, where there is no market for minority
shares.99
Some scholars have argued for a more hands-off approach even in
closely held corporations, where exit is much more difficult.100 They
argue that minority investors who fail to contract for protections, like
dissolution provisions, may be trying to signal that they will not engage
in opportunistic behavior by, for example, threatening to block
beneficial corporate actions unless they are given a disproportionate
96. See supra notes 72–79 and accompanying text.
97. See, e.g., MOLL & RAGAZZO, supra note 69, § 7.01[A] n.13 (“In a publicly held
corporation, the presence of a well-functioning market also exerts some discipline on those in
control.”); Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target’s Management
in Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1161, 1196 (1981) (identifying the threat of
exit as “the most powerful check on agency costs”); Henry G. Manne, Mergers and the Market for
Corporate Control, 73 J. POL. ECON. 110, 112 (1965). See generally HIRSCHMAN, supra note 62
(describing exit as one important lever of governance).
98. Mendel v. Carroll is an interesting example, in which a controlling shareholder of a
publicly traded company proposed a freezeout merger to cash out the minority shares. Mendel v.
Carroll, 651 A.2d 297, 298–99 (Del. Ch. 1994). When a third party made a competing offer for two
dollars more per share, the controlling shareholder withdrew its merger proposal and announced
that it had no interest in selling to the third party, effectively killing the deal and preventing the
minority from selling at a premium. Id. at 300–02. The court held that the controlling shareholder
had no duty to facilitate the sale. Id. at 306. In other words, the controlling shareholder was free
to selfishly deny the corporation a benefit, so long as it did not disproportionately hurt the
minority shareholders. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, There Is No Affirmative Action for Minorities,
Shareholder and Otherwise, in Corporate Law, 118 YALE L.J. POCKET PART 71, 75 (2008).
99. See, e.g., MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 13.02(b) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2002); MOLL &
RAGAZZO, supra note 69, § 7.01[A], [D][1][a]–[b].
100. See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 95, at 243–52 (highlighting several faults with
the position that strict fiduciary standards, which are fundamental principles of partnership law,
should be applied to closely held corporations); Easterbrook & Fischel, Close Corporations, supra
note 87, at 301.
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share of the profits.101 The parties are thus precommitting that they will
not withdraw their capital at a time when the corporation might be
vulnerable. But courts in most states require more of the majority in
closely held corporations.102 Even where the corporate charter is silent,
the default rule is an implicit delegation to courts of at least some
power to police for majority opportunism.103
2. Kaldor-Hicks-Style Duty. The next point on the spectrum of
potential voter duties, which I am calling Kaldor-Hicks, would require
voters to act in the best interests of the collective, regardless of how the
benefits and burdens are distributed.104 Whatever duty the voters bear
runs to the collective organization, not to other voters. In other words,
the majority would be allowed to impose costs on the minority, as long
as doing so would benefit the collective as a whole.
The classic case, Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc.,105 comes
close to the Kaldor-Hicks approach. The court held that the majority
shareholders had breached their duty to a minority shareholder by
removing him from the payroll of a closely held corporation. Because
there was no market for his shares and the corporation distributed all
of its profits through salaries to its shareholder-employees, not through
dividends, this effectively cut the minority shareholder out of any
economic benefit of ownership.
The court in Wilkes recognized that the majority’s duty to the
minority must be balanced against its right to “‘selfish ownership’ in
the corporation,” permitting it “room to maneuver” and “a large
101. Easterbrook & Fischel, Close Corporations, supra note 87, at 287.
102. See MOLL & RAGAZZO, supra note 69, § 7.01[D][1][a]–[b]. It is worth noting that
Delaware does not impose any sort of heightened duty on majority shareholders in closely held
corporations. See, e.g., Nixon v. Blackwell, 626 A.2d 1366, 1380–81 (Del. 1993); Blaustein v. Lord
Baltimore Capital Corp., C.A. No. 6685–VCN, 2013 WL 1810956, at *14 nn.83–84 (Del. Ch.
Apr. 30, 2013), aff’d 84 A.3d 954 (Del. 2014). This is, perhaps, because Delaware has no interest
in attracting closely held corporations and does not want these sorts of duties to pollute its law
governing public corporations, which it very actively tries to attract. See Marcel Kahan & Ehud
Kamar, The Myth of State Competition in Corporate Law, 55 STAN. L. REV. 679, 724–26 (2002)
(acknowledging Delaware’s corporate-law dominance amongst the states and its economic
interest in maintaining the status quo).
103. See Coffee, supra note 23, at 1620.
104. I draw this label from the economic concept of Kaldor-Hicks efficiency. A change in the
state of affairs is said to be a Kaldor-Hicks improvement if the people who benefit from the
change could hypothetically compensate those who are made worse off; in other words, it does
more good than harm in the aggregate. But no actual compensation is required, so some people
can be left worse off, so long as the welfare of the group as a whole improves. See 2 THE NEW
PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 417 (Peter Newman ed., 1998).
105. Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc., 353 N.E.2d 657 (Mass. 1976).
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measure of discretion” in making decisions for the company.106 The
court went on to explain that the majority could vote to disadvantage
the minority in pursuit of a “legitimate business purpose” (that is,
something reasonably calculated to benefit the corporation as a whole)
that could not practicably be accomplished through means less harmful
to the minority.107 There simply was no legitimate business purpose for
terminating the minority shareholder on the facts of this case—the
majority fired him because of a personal falling out. Wilkes, and the
cases that have followed it,108 thus placed primary emphasis on the
reasonableness of the majority’s conduct with respect to the
corporation as a whole rather than its effect on the minority.109
But Wilkes, and corporate law more generally, do not fully
embrace the Kaldor-Hicks approach because they are never
completely indifferent to the distribution of benefits and burdens. A
fundamental principle of corporate law is that any distribution of
profits to shareholders must be pro rata.110 Thus, even under the Wilkes
approach where the majority’s duty would not prevent it from harming
the minority, it can never deny the minority shareholders their
proportional share of distributed profits. The majority cannot go below
this pro rata floor created by the minority’s mere status as a

106. Id. at 663–64.
107. Id.
108. See, e.g., McCann v. McCann, 275 P.3d 824, 832 (Idaho 2012) (“[I]t is possible for courts
to find [legitimate uses of corporate power] harmful if the end result could have been achieved
with less injury to the minority shareholder.”); G&N Aircraft, Inc. v. Boehm, 743 N.E.2d 227, 242
(Ind. 2001) (“If this was done for legitimate business reasons, it is protected by the business
judgment rule.”); Toner v. Baltimore Envelope Co., 498 A.2d 642, 653 (Md. 1985) (citing with
approval the reasoning in Wilkes); Pointer v. Castellani, 918 N.E.2d 805, 816 (Mass. 2009) (citing
Wilkes’s “selfish ownership” principle while upholding the lower court’s ruling that the majority
shareholders breached a fiduciary duty in a “freeze-out” of the president); Daniels v. Thomas,
Dean, & Hoskins, Inc., 804 P.2d 359, 366 (Mont. 1990) (“[T]he controlling group should not be
stymied by a minority stockholder’s grievances if the controlling group can demonstrate a
legitimate business purpose and the minority stockholder cannot demonstrate a less harmful
alternative.”); Crosby v. Beam, 548 N.E.2d 217, 221 (Ohio 1989) (holding that a breach of the
fiduciary duty by majority shareholders, “absent a legitimate business purpose, is actionable”);
Long v. Atlantic PBS, Inc., 681 A.2d 249, 256 n.8 (R.I. 1996); Nelson v. Martin, 958 S.W.2d 643,
650 (Tenn. 1997).
109. See Douglas K. Moll, Shareholder Oppression in Close Corporations: The Unanswered
Question of Perspective, 53 VAND. L. REV. 749, 762–63 (2000); see also MOLL & RAGAZZO, supra
note 69, § 7.01[D][1][c] (discussing majority versus minority perspectives of oppression).
110. See, e.g., Twenty Seven Tr. v. Realty Growth Inv’rs, 533 F. Supp. 1028, 1040 (D. Md.
1982). Different classes of stock, of course, might be entitled to different distributions, but here I
am only talking about common stockholders, who are the residual claimants of the corporation
and the ones typically endowed with voting rights.
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shareholder, even if doing so would benefit the corporation as a
whole.111
One additional feature of Wilkes also deviated from a pure
Kaldor-Hicks approach. Wilkes appeared to require the majority to
minimize the harm to the minority. When taking actions that would
harm the minority’s interests, the majority must show that there are no
practicable alternatives that would achieve the same business purposes
while doing less harm to the minority.112
A pure Kaldor-Hicks style duty would require voters in the
majority to attempt to maximize collective gains for the corporate
venture regardless of how the benefits and burdens are distributed. But
corporate law places a limit on the extent to which majority
shareholders can impose costs on the minority for the benefit of the
corporation. Although the majority can impose burdens on the
minority for legitimate business purposes up to a point, it must afford
the minority its pro rata shares of distributed profits.
3. Pareto-Style Duty. Further along the spectrum is what I am
calling a Pareto-style duty, which would generally allow voters to act in
their own interests, but would require them to refrain from harming
the minority.113 The majority would not have to put the minority’s
interests ahead of its own and vote to disadvantage itself to benefit the
minority like a true fiduciary duty of loyalty would require, but neither
could it harm the minority just because doing so would benefit the
collective more.
Another classic, In re Kemp & Beatley, Inc.,114 appears to take the
Pareto approach. There, the majority shareholders in a closely held
corporation ceased paying de facto dividends (in the form of “bonuses”
paid in proportion to the number of shares held) to two shareholders
after they stopped working for the company.115 The court held that the
majority shareholders breached their duties (allowing the minority to
111. See, e.g., Gimpel v. Bolstein, 477 N.Y.S.2d 1017, 1022–23 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1984) (holding
that majority shareholders were justified in firing a minority shareholder who was embezzling
money from a corporation, but that they had to “either alter the corporate financial structure so
as to commence payment of dividends, or else make a reasonable offer to buy out [his] interest”).
112. Wilkes, 353 N.E.2d at 663.
113. I draw this label from the economic concept of Pareto efficiency. A change in the state
of affairs is said to be a Pareto improvement if it leaves at least one person better off without
making anyone worse off. See 3 THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE
LAW 6–9 (Peter Newman ed., 1998).
114. In re Kemp & Beatley, Inc., 473 N.E.2d 1173 (N.Y. 1984).
115. Id. at 1176.
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force an involuntary dissolution for oppression) by frustrating the
minority shareholders’ “reasonable expectations” about what they
would receive for committing their capital to a closely held
corporation.116 Unlike the Kaldor-Hicks approach in Wilkes, which
primarily asked about the effects on the corporation as a whole, the
focus in Kemp was squarely on how the majority’s actions affected the
minority.117
A pure Pareto-style duty would prohibit the majority from using
its voting power to harm the minority’s interests, even if doing so would
further legitimate business purposes and benefit the corporation as a
whole. Kemp itself may not have gone quite this far (and, indeed, the
court backed off earlier cases that had embraced a purer version of the
Pareto-style duty118). The court in Kemp emphasized that it is the
minority’s reasonable expectations “objectively viewed” that matter.119
The majority does not violate its duty simply because the minority’s

116. Id.; see also Stefano v. Coppock, 705 P.2d 443, 446 n.3 (Alaska 1985) (“Oppressive
conduct . . . can be . . . difficult to discern. We favor the view recently expressed by the New York
Court of Appeals [in Kemp] . . . .”); Smith v. Leonard, 876 S.W.2d 266, 272 (Ark. 1994) (“We have
not previously addressed either ‘oppression’ or ‘reasonable expectations’ . . . but [In re Kemp] . .
. is instructive.”); Baur v. Baur Farms, Inc., 832 N.W.2d 663, 674 (Iowa 2013) (holding the
minority’s reasonable expectations as the touchstone of oppression analysis); In re Dissolution of
Clever Innovations, Inc., 941 N.Y.S.2d 777, 779–80 (N.Y. App. Div. 2012) (“Oppression has been
defined as conduct of a controlling shareholder that substantially defeats expectations that,
viewed objectively, ‘were both reasonable under the circumstances and . . . central to the
[oppressed shareholder’s] decision to join the venture.’” (quoting In re Kemp, 473 N.E.2d at
1179)); Balvik v. Sylvester, 411 N.W.2d 383, 388 n.3 (N.D. 1987) (noting that reasonable
expectations was the test laid out by the legislature); Landstrom v. Shaver, 561 N.W.2d 1, 8 (S.D.
1997) (balancing minority’s “reasonable expectations” against corporations’ business judgment);
McLaughlin v. Schenk, 220 P.3d 146, 157 (Utah 2009) (“[T]he court must consider . . . whether or
not a shareholder’s reasonable expectations were thwarted.”).
117. See MOLL & RAGAZZO, supra note 69, § 7.01[D][1][c]; Moll, supra note 109, at 764–65.
118. In re Topper, 433 N.Y.S.2d 359, 362 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1980) (holding that it was irrelevant
whether the majority shareholders had good cause to fire an incompetent minority shareholder;
they breached their duty if they frustrated the minority shareholder’s expectation that he would
be employed by the corporation and share in profits distributed as salary); see Moll, supra note
109, at 768 (noting that In re Kemp backs off this approach). Professor Douglas Moll explains that
under the “pure minority perspective” in In re Topper, “[a]ny majority actions that harm [the
minority’s] expectations—even actions justified by a legitimate business purpose—will trigger
oppression liability.” Id. at 767. Along similar lines, in Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., the
majority caused the corporation to offer to buy back the retiring founder’s stock at a favorable
price, and the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court held that the majority breached its fiduciary
duty to the minority by failing to offer them an equal opportunity to sell their stock back at the
same price. Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 328 N.E.2d 505, 520 (Mass. 1975). The same court
backed off this Pareto-style rule in Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc., 353 N.E.2d 657, 663–
64 (Mass. 1976).
119. In re Kemp, 473 N.E.2d at 1179.
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“subjective hopes and desires in joining the venture are not fulfilled.”120
In any event, even under a purer conception of a Pareto-style duty, the
majority need not subordinate its interests to those of the minority like
a truly loyal fiduciary would.
4. True Duty of Loyalty. At the “true loyalty” end of the spectrum,
voters in the majority would have to act for the exclusive benefit of
those in the minority and subordinate their own interests. This form of
duty is much more suited to the principal–agent situation, where the
fiduciary acts on behalf of the beneficiary, than to the context of a
group of principals deciding on a course of action through voting.
Voting among principals is a way to identify and aggregate
preferences.121 To require the majority to act for the exclusive benefit
of the minority when an issue is put to a vote would deny the majority
any right to selfish ownership and beg the question: Why hold a vote in
the first place if the winning side will have to do what the losing side
wants? Further, the classic legal tools of the fiduciary duty of loyalty—
its prophylactic prohibitions on self-dealing and conflicts of interest—
are not designed for this type of situation. A true-loyalty obligation
would put voters in precisely the type of conundrum that fiduciary law
tries to avoid: a position where they must balance their own interests
against the beneficiary’s interests.
It is hard to find private-law examples of a true-loyalty voter duty.
As Professor Stephen Bainbridge has argued, there is no affirmative
action in corporate law; voters in the majority generally need not
subordinate their interests to those of the minority as a true fiduciary
would.122 Even in partnerships, where the black-letter law is that
partners are fiduciaries for other partners,123 the duty that partners owe
each other, principal-to-principal, does not look like a true duty of

120. Id.
121. See, e.g., Grant M. Hayden & Matthew T. Bodie, The Bizarre Law & Economics of
Business Roundtable v. SEC, 38 J. CORP. L. 101, 120 (2012) (“The function of a voting procedure,
for political and corporate entities, is to aggregate . . . preferences.”).
122. Bainbridge, supra note 98, at 75 (“[W]hile corporate law ensures that the majority may
not benefit itself at the expense and to the exclusion of the minority, corporate law does not
require the majority affirmatively to benefit the minority at its own expense.”); see also Deborah
A. DeMott, Agency Principles and Large Block Shareholders, 19 CARDOZO L. REV. 321, 323
(1997) (contrasting constraints that would apply to large block shareholders if they were agents
for other shareholders with current doctrine in which no such duty exists).
123. E.g., Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928) (describing the partner’s
fiduciary duty as “the punctilio of an honor the most sensitive”).
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loyalty: the majority need not subordinate its interests to the
minority’s.124
Other countries may come closer to this true-loyalty approach for
voters. In the controversial case Gambotto v. WCP Ltd.,125 for example,
the High Court of Australia held that the majority shareholders of a
publicly held corporation could not cash out the minority’s shares
(even at a premium) except to avoid significant detriment or harm to
the company.126 This approach goes beyond a Pareto-style duty; it
appears to empower the minority to not only block actions that might
benefit the corporation, but even to impose costs on the corporation—
up to the point of “significant detriment.”127 But it is inconsistent with
the approach taken by U.S. corporate law.128
5. Summary. Although some cases refer to shareholders’ right to
vote selfishly and others to the “fiduciary” obligations of majority
shareholders, voter duties tend not to fall at either the no-duty or trueloyalty poles. Instead, corporate-law voter duties tend to fall mostly in
the Kaldor-Hicks or Pareto categories—or somewhere in between (as
illustrated in Figure 2).

124. See UNIF. P’SHIP ACT, supra note 73, § 404(e) cmt. 5. As the comment to § 404(e)
explains:
[T]he partner’s rights as an owner and principal in the enterprise . . . must always be
balanced against his duties and obligations as an agent and fiduciary. For example, a
partner who, with consent, owns a shopping center may . . . legitimately vote against a
proposal by the partnership to open a competing shopping center.
Id.; see also Crim Truck & Tractor Co. v. Navistar Int’l Transp. Corp., 823 S.W.2d 591, 594 (Tex.
1992) (holding that although a fiduciary relationship gives rise to a duty to “deal fairly,” it does
not require the party to place the interest of the other party above her own).
125. Gambotto v WCP Ltd (1995) 182 CLR 432 (Austl.).
126. Id. at 459–60.
127. See Jennifer Hill, Visions and Revisions of the Shareholder, 48 AM. J. COMP. L. 39, 65
(2000).
128. See id. at 41.
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Figure 2: Voter Duty Spectrum with Examples

At first glance it might seem like investors would insist on at least
a Pareto-style voting duty before they surrender their autonomy and
commit their capital to a venture. Otherwise they leave themselves
open to unfavorable treatment in the event that they find themselves
outvoted. But shareholders might rationally accept something closer to
a Kaldor-Hicks-style voting duty with a pro rata floor under conditions
of uncertainty.129 They might prefer the majority to direct its efforts
towards maximizing the value of the corporation rather than ensuring
that no individual shareholders are left worse off if they do not know
whether they will be in the majority or minority on any given issue,
their proportional shares of the expected gains from such efforts are
great, or both.
It is quite plausible that a Kaldor-Hicks-style duty could lead to
significant collective gains over a Pareto-style duty. A pure Paretostyle voter duty running to all other shareholders could saddle the
corporation with counterproductive pet projects of minority
shareholders and potentially lead to paralysis. For example, the
majority would violate a pure Pareto-style duty by firing even a clearly
incompetent minority shareholder employed by the corporation.130 It
is not difficult to see how such a duty could undercut productivity. (A
true duty of loyalty, of course, raises even more difficulties.131)
But a pure Kaldor-Hicks-style duty does too little to protect the
minority for investors to be likely to agree to it ex ante—particularly

129. See Gillette, supra note 54, at 629; supra notes 110–11 and accompanying text; Clayton
P. Gillette, Expropriation and Institutional Design in State and Local Government Law, 80 VA. L.
REV. 625, 629 (1994).
130. See supra note 118.
131. See supra Part II.B.4.
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where exit is difficult, as it is in a closely held corporation.132 Under a
pure Kaldor-Hicks-style duty, the majority could simply expropriate
the minority’s share of the profits, so long as it led to some benefit for
the corporation as a whole. Thus investors’ willingness to gamble on
the chance of greater gains from a duty running primarily to the
collective instead of the minority depends, at a minimum, on the
guarantee of a pro rata distribution. They need at least some backstop
against exploitation.133
A pro rata guarantee standing alone, however, is not enough.
Even with a pro rata guarantee, investors would be unlikely to agree to
a rule allowing the majority to vote benefits to itself at the expense of
the corporation as a whole; that is, they would be unlikely to accept the
hands-off, no-duty approach. Such a rule would leave them vulnerable
to exploitation, as the majority could capture all of the private gain of
looting the corporation, leaving the dispossessed minority only the cold
comfort of knowing that the majority shared the resulting corporate
losses pro rata.
It is not always clear what is in the best interests of the
corporation, and courts are not necessarily the best institutions to
figure that out.134 As a result, courts tend not to second-guess business
judgments arrived at through the ordinary governance mechanisms of
the corporation.135 But the business judgment rule is not a license for
exploitation. And courts continue to play an essential role in policing
for opportunistic abuses of corporate collective-choice mechanisms

132. See Douglas K. Moll, Shareholder Oppression and “Fair Value”: Of Discounts, Dates,
and Dastardly Deeds in the Close Corporation, 54 DUKE L.J. 293, 296 (2004) (explaining the
difficulty of liquidating close-corporation shares because there is not a “ready market”).
133. Professors J.A.C. Hetherington and Michael Dooley define “exploitation” as the
following: “[O]ne shareholder exploits another when he uses his position to capture a significant
portion of the other’s ‘share’ of the firm’s income and profits; the other’s share may be defined as
the portion of income and profits the parties would agree, through arms-length negotiation,
belonged to that shareholder.” J.A.C. Hetherington & Michael P. Dooley, Illiquidity and
Exploitation: A Proposed Statutory Solution to the Remaining Close Corporation Problem, 63 VA.
L. REV. 1, 4 (1977).
134. AC Acquisitions Corp. v. Anderson, Clayton & Co., 519 A.2d 103, 111 (Del. Ch. 1986);
Auerbach v. Bennett, 393 N.E.2d 994, 1001 (N.Y. 1979); cf. Rave, supra note 13, at 673 (noting
the similar problem of institutional competence in constitutional law).
135. See, e.g., Orman v. Cullman, 794 A.2d 5, 20 (Del. 2002) (“[A]bsent an abuse of discretion,
[business judgment] will be respected by the courts.” (quoting Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805,
812 (Del. 1984))); Auerbach, 393 N.E.2d at 1000; D. Gordon Smith, The Modern Business
Judgment Rule 3 (BYU Law Research Paper Series, No. 15-09, 2015), http://ssrn.com/
abstract=2620536 [https://perma.cc/H2JJ-2SAN].
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and making sure that all parties act in good faith.136 Even if investors
may not always demand Pareto-style protections, without the
assurance that courts will require the majority to have at least a
rational, good-faith explanation for how its actions benefit the
collective and a promise that profits will be distributed pro rata,
investors are unlikely to contribute their capital to ventures governed
by majority rule—at least not without extensive (and costly) ex ante
contractual protections.
III. FIDUCIARY VOTERS IN PUBLIC LAW?
Why do we decide things by voting? Well, to paraphrase Winston
Churchill, it is the least bad of a bunch of lousy options.137 Organizing
a political society runs into the same problem of collective action as
forming a business organization. As Hobbes explained, in a world
where each person has complete autonomy, cooperation in pursuit of
joint gains is nearly impossible; any individual can threaten to hold
out.138 The solution is also the same. In order to realize the gains from
cooperation, individuals—whether investors or citizens—must
surrender their autonomy to some institution empowered to make
collective decisions for the group (and to cram them down over the
objection of holdouts). Majority rule, as Professor Adam Przeworski
explained, works well as that collective-choice institution because the
outcome of a vote is a reasonable proxy for the result of a violent
struggle, should it come to that.139
Of course, majority rule leaves the minority vulnerable. But so
long as the minority has a realistic hope of joining a ruling coalition in
the future and some assurance that by surrendering its autonomy it has
not left itself open to exploitation at the hands of the majority or the
newly empowered ruling class, it will be content to go along until the
next cycle.140 Thus providing institutional responses to these risks
(competitive elections, repeat play, structural minority protections,
independent judicial review, etc.) is essential to getting the minority to
buy into either a business or political venture.

136. See, e.g., Coffee, supra note 23, at 1621, 1681.
137. 444 Parl Deb HC (5th ser.) (1947) col. 207 (UK) (“[D]emocracy is the worst form of
Government except all those other forms that have been tried from time to time.”).
138. See generally THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN (1651).
139. Adam Przeworski, Minimalist Conception of Democracy: A Defense, in DEMOCRACY’S
VALUE 23, 23–55 (Ian Shapiro & Casiano Hacker-Cordón eds., 1999).
140. See id. at 31–39.

RAVE IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

2016]

FIDUCIARY VOTERS?

10/26/2016 10:16 PM

363

Given their similarities at the most fundamental level, looking at
private-law approaches to governance problems can be illuminating for
problems in constitutional law, as there is often an actual social
contract instead of just a hypothetical one. Operating a collective
business venture presents the same governance challenges that
Madison identified in a democracy: checking self-dealing agents and
preventing the tyranny of the majority. The legal and institutional
responses to these problems in contexts where investors must sign on
through consensual transactions can shed light on strategies for dealing
with similar challenges in the public sphere where actual consent is not
possible.
The translation is not perfect, to be sure. There are strong
equitable norms running through private law and relatively clear rules
on how joint gains should be distributed.141 Constitutional law, by
contrast, has only a less clearly defined equal protection norm.142 And
there is far more consensus that the goal of private business
organizations is wealth maximization than there will ever be on what
counts as the “public interest.”
Still, the fundamental problems of collective action are quite
similar. And examining areas where the private law imposes duties on
voters may help us understand the intuition behind the Supreme
Court’s sometimes puzzling approach to equal protection in direct
democracy. It may also help provide guidance for future decisions.
A. The Analogy
The duties that corporate law imposes on majority shareholders in
closely held corporations may be particularly useful models for
analyzing direct democracy. The more obvious analogue for
representative democracy might be a publicly traded corporation, with
its centralized management and large and diffuse body of
shareholders.143 But several features of direct democracy make it look
more like a closely held corporation, even though there are far more

141. See, e.g., Anupam Chander, Minorities, Shareholder and Otherwise, 113 YALE L.J. 119,
125–27 (2003) (highlighting corporate law’s concern that “insiders [not] simply maximize
shareholder wealth, but that they must do so equitably”).
142. See id. at 179.
143. See Rave, supra note 13, at 708 (drawing the analogy between legislators and directors
in public corporations); cf. Bainbridge, supra note 98, at 73 (“[T]he analogy between close
corporations and the body politic seems weak, at best . . . . [T]he body politic most closely
resembles the public corporation . . . .”).
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voters in the typical ballot initiative than the typical closely held
corporation.
First, the difficulty of exit in the political process can make voting
scenarios look more like closely held corporations, where there is
typically no market for shares, than publicly traded corporations,
where the market is robust. The costs of picking up and moving out of
a jurisdiction can be high and even prohibitive for some.144
Second, direct democracy lacks the intermediation of elected
agents with duties to represent the political unit as a whole.145 It is the
principals themselves who vote in a plebiscite. Similarly, in closely held
corporations the shareholders themselves are typically also the
directors (or at least dominate the board).146 Thus it is the relationships
among the shareholders that really matter, not the relationship
between the shareholders and intermediaries like directors (as is the
case in publicly traded corporations where ownership and control are
separated).
And third, the lack of repeat play in direct democracy leaves
minorities particularly vulnerable in a way that they are not in either
representative democracy or a public corporation.147 Indeed, without
repeat play, minorities may be even more vulnerable in direct
democracy than in closely held corporations, though many corporate
oppression cases arise at the end of the parties’ relationship, when the
majority has no intention of “playing” with the minority in the future.
There are obviously dissimilarities as well (the size of the body and
the cohesiveness of their interests, to name a few). But still, the analogy
may be able to tell us something useful about the strategies that the law
has found to address situations where collective action is desirable, but
interests diverge. A duty of fair dealing running from the majority to
the minority might be at least a partial substitute for the structural
protections that direct democracy lacks. On the view that the minority
would not willingly leave itself so vulnerable in the hypothetical social
contract, the lack of structural protections might trigger such a duty on
the part of voters in the majority.

144. See supra notes 62–64 and accompanying text.
145. See supra notes 48–49 and accompanying text.
146. See Hollis v. Hill, 232 F.3d 460, 463 (5th Cir. 2000); MOLL & RAGAZZO, supra note 69,
§ 2.01[A][2].
147. See supra notes 54–55.
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B. Voter Duties Clarify Equal Protection Review of Direct
Democracy
One way to understand the intuition behind equal protection
doctrine in this area is to think of the Supreme Court as applying a duty
running from the majority to the minority when it reviews the output
of direct democracy. Despite its statement in Hollingsworth v. Perry
that voters have no “fiduciary obligation,”148 the Court appears
unwilling to take the completely hands-off view that direct-democracy
voters have no duties and can vote in their narrow self-interest. So it
steps in to police for opportunism.
Indeed, in several cases, the Court has stepped in when the
majority used a ballot initiative to exploit a minority. In Reitman v.
Mulkey149 and Hunter v. Erickson,150 for example, the Court struck
down the results of ballot initiatives that targeted racial minorities by
rolling back antidiscrimination statutes and making it harder to enact
antidiscrimination legislation in the future.151 And in Romer v. Evans,
the Court struck down a state constitutional amendment passed by
ballot initiative that targeted gay people by barring any claims of
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation.152
None of these cases is easily explained by traditional equal
protection analysis. Reitman pushed the state-action doctrine into
questionable territory by finding that the state “encouraged” private
racial discrimination by repealing a fair-housing law, and it is hard to
reconcile with later cases.153 Hunter relied on a “political process”
doctrine—that a state violates equal protection when it shifts
policymaking authority on a racial issue to a different level of
government where it is harder for racial minorities to win—which the
Court later disavowed.154 And Romer refused to treat sexual

148. Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652, 2666–67 (2013).
149. Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967).
150. Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385 (1969).
151. Id. at 393; Reitman, 387 U.S. at 381.
152. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 635 (1996).
153. E.g., Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1006–12 (1982) (holding that state regulation and
funding did not convert a private nursing home into a state actor); Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457
U.S. 830, 840–43 (1982) (holding that a private school’s public function and state funding did not
make it a state actor).
154. See Schuette v. Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action, Integration & Immigrant Rights &
Fight for Equal. by Any Means Necessary (BAMN), 134 S. Ct. 1623, 1634–37 (2014) (plurality
opinion) (rejecting political-process doctrine and reinterpreting Hunter).
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orientation as a suspect classification yet still applied a heightened
form of rational-basis review to strike down the law.155
But what these three cases have in common is the fact that they all
involved instances where a majority of the voters used a ballot initiative
to roll back protections that minority groups had won through the
legislative process. Justice Douglas recognized as much in his
concurrence in Reitman, where he stressed the danger that direct
democracy poses to minorities, citing James Madison.156
In this sense, the Court is playing the same institutional role in
reviewing the output of direct democracy that courts play in corporate
law: policing for opportunism. And constitutional law presents many
of the same institutional tradeoffs as corporate law. Courts are not
likely to be any better at figuring out what is in the public interest than
they are at making business judgments.157 As Judge Hand said, “[I]t
would be most irksome to be ruled by a bevy of Platonic Guardians.”158
So we try to design institutions that will be better at making collective
choices and to adopt governance structures that will be self-correcting.
When they work, those institutions get a lot of leeway to exercise
discretion.159 We also try to specify in advance some limitations on what
the majority can do through those institutions, and so, for example, the
Constitution includes a Bill of Rights.
But the costs of specificity are high, so, as in corporate law, we end
up delegating some power to the courts to police for opportunism after
the fact. And the risk of opportunism is greatest where the structural
protections for minorities are weakest. Thus we allow states to
experiment with direct democracy, despite the Republican Guarantee

155. Romer, 517 U.S. at 630–36.
156. Reitman, 387 U.S. at 387 (Douglas, J., concurring) (“‘Wherever the real power in a
Government lies, there is the danger of oppression. In our Governments the real power lies in the
majority of the Community, and the invasion of private rights is chiefly to be apprehended, not
from acts of government contrary to the sense of its constituents, but from acts in which the
Government is the mere instrument of the major number of the Constituents.’” (quoting 5 THE
WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 272 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1904))).
157. See Rave, supra note 13, at 694–95; Rave, supra note 91, at 1–2.
158. LEARNED HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 73 (1958).
159. This is, of course, the justification in Carolene Products for the presumption of
constitutionality and deferential rational-basis review of the output of a well-functioning political
process. See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 (1938); see also Fred O. Smith,
Jr., Due Process, Republicanism, and Direct Democracy, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 582, 584 (2014)
(arguing that “well-ordered republican process is due process” and thus exempt from judicial
scrutiny but that the same may not hold true of direct democracy).
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Clause160 and the Framers’ skepticism toward the institution,161 only
because we have the safety valve of ex post judicial review. Courts
intuitively know that they have to rein in the excesses of direct
democracy for the same reasons they have to check shareholder
majorities.
So what kind of duty is the Court applying to direct-democracy
voters? It does not appear to be a true fiduciary duty of loyalty. The
Court does not require the majority to subordinate its interests to those
of the minority. This much is clear from its decision in Schuette to
uphold the Michigan ballot initiative banning affirmative action.162
Affirmative action—at least in the plurality’s view—extended a benefit
to the minority at the majority’s expense. And the Court refused to
step in when the majority decided to take that benefit away.163
The duty that the Court applied appears to be one of
antiexploitation—the majority must deal fairly and equitably with the
minority but need not subordinate its own interests. But where on the
spectrum of potential voter duties does this duty fall? Do majority
voters owe a duty not to impose any burdens on the minority (Pareto)?
Or just a duty not to impose burdens on the minority for no reason,
that is, unless it is reasonably calculated to benefit the public as a whole
(Kaldor-Hicks)? The answer is not entirely clear.
Schuette might have come out differently if the majority voters had
borne a Pareto-style duty to refrain from harming the minority, but it
would have depended on the baseline. Affording admissions
preferences to racial minorities might reasonably be viewed as the
majority subordinating its interests to the minority’s and extending a
benefit to the minority at its own expense—something a Pareto-style

160. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4; Pac. States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Oregon, 223 U.S. 118, 149–51
(1912) (stating that whether citizen lawmaking qualifies as a “republican form of government” is
a nonjusticiable political question); see also Hans A. Linde, When Initiative Lawmaking Is Not
“Republican Government”: The Campaign Against Homosexuality, 72 OR. L. REV. 19, 31 (1993)
(arguing that some exercises of citizen lawmaking can violate the Republican Guarantee Clause).
But see Robert G. Natelson, A Republic, Not a Democracy? Initiative, Referendum, and the
Constitution’s Guarantee Clause, 80 TEX. L. REV. 807, 814 (2002) (arguing on originalist grounds
that “[c]itizen lawmaking as practiced in the United States today does not violate the Guarantee
Clause”).
161. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, supra note 29, at 61 (James Madison).
162. Schuette v. Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action, Integration & Immigrant Rights & Fight
for Equal. by Any Means Necessary (BAMN), 134 S. Ct. 1623, 1638 (2014) (plurality opinion).
163. Id.
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duty would not require.164 But once that benefit is extended, the
baseline shifts and taking it away hurts the minority, which voters
would not be allowed to do under a Pareto-style duty. Justice
Sotomayor, in her dissent, took this Pareto view with existing
affirmative-action programs as the baseline. But the Court rejected
it.165
The baseline’s importance can be seen in the debate between
Justice Scalia and Justice Sotomayor over whether the political-process
doctrine ossifies the preexisting allocation of decisionmaking authority
over racial issues.166 Sotomayor viewed the majority as using a
majoritarian tool to take something away from the minority and make
it difficult for it to win back in the future; to reinstate affirmative action,
they would have to amend the Michigan constitution.167 This violated
the Fourteenth Amendment, according to Sotomayor, because it
“alter[ed] the political process in a manner that uniquely burdened
racial minorities’ ability to achieve their goals through that process.”168
Scalia protested that this approach would lock in the status quo and
prevent the majority from using a ballot initiative to undo earlier
legislative capture by a powerful rent-seeking minority.169 The Justices

164. Set aside the debates over whether affirmative action actually benefits minorities and
whether it is needed to remedy past harms. Compare id. at 1675–83 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting)
(arguing that “race matters,” that affirmative action is necessary to address persistent inequality,
and that eliminating it hurts minority students), with Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 373 (2003)
(Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (arguing that affirmative action “stamp[s]
minorities with a badge of inferiority and may cause them to develop dependencies”).
165. The Court came much closer to embracing a Pareto approach in Washington v. Seattle
School District No. 1, which struck down a ballot initiative that rolled back a voluntary busing
scheme aimed at combating de facto segregation. Washington v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S.
457, 470 (1982). But the Court’s ambivalence toward the result in Seattle School is evident in its
decision in Schuette. Schuette, 134 S. Ct. at 1633 (plurality opinion).
166. Compare Schuette, 134 S. Ct. at 1645 (Scalia, J., concurring) (contrasting the process of
amending Michigan’s constitution with electing a preferred university governing board), with id.
at 1662–63, 1673–74 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (arguing that minorities would face an uphill
battle in amending Michigan’s constitution). The baseline is always a problem with a Pareto
approach. See Amartya Sen, The Impossibility of a Paretian Liberal, 78 J. POL. ECON. 152, 156
(1970).
167. Schuette, 134 S. Ct. at 1662–63 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
168. Id. at 1659.
169. Id. at 1646 (Scalia, J., concurring); accord id. at 1636 (plurality opinion). Scalia took a
similar position in his dissent in Romer v. Evans, where he argued that the powerful “homosexual”
lobby had captured local governments and, under the logic of Federalist 10, only a statewide ballot
initiative could overcome those local factions. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 644–47 (1996)
(Scalia, J., dissenting). Scalia did not fully embrace the Madisonian position, however, as he
admitted that statewide elected officials were sympathetic, and it was only an appeal to the people
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were talking past each other in part because Sotomayor focused on
how hard it is for minorities (and how easy it is for the majority) to win
in direct democracy, while Scalia focused on how hard it is for the
majority (and how easy it is for cohesive minorities) to win in
representative democracy.170
This debate also reveals a difficulty with a Pareto-style voter duty:
it arguably gives the majority a claim when the minority uses structural
protections (like supermajority voting rules or other veto points) to
block actions supported by the majority. Indeed, corporate law
recognizes oppression claims brought by the majority against the
minority, though they are rare.171 The potential for either the majority
or minority to invoke a Pareto-style duty could lead to paralysis. And
it could undermine the balance struck in the constitutional design
between majoritarianism and minority protection.
Further, a strict application of a Pareto-style duty might block
voters from using a ballot initiative to adopt beneficial policies.
Consider a progressive income-tax system. Even if high marginal tax
rates could be shown to significantly benefit the public as a whole, they
would hurt a minority (rich people). Now maybe direct democracy
should not be used to set tax policy (Madison would certainly have
been troubled by it), but equal protection doctrine has not gone so
far.172 And, as noted above, it is quite plausible under a contractarian
theory that individuals would not insist on a Pareto-style duty and
would agree to a lesser duty under conditions of uncertainty.173
So perhaps the Court’s direct-democracy cases are more
consistent with a Kaldor-Hicks-style duty that would allow voters to
themselves—the very sort of majority faction that Madison feared—that reversed policies
favoring gay people. Id. at 646.
170. Compare Schuette, 134 S. Ct. at 1661–62 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (explaining that
“[m]inority groups face an especially uphill battle” in amending the Michigan constitution, getting
an amendment passed is “no small task,” and the “costs of qualifying for an amendment are
significant”), with id. at 1645 (Scalia, J., concurring) (stating that “[a]mending the Constitution
requires the approval of only ‘a majority of the electors voting on the question,’” but that voting
in a favorable board of regents requires prevailing in a series of elections over different election
cycles (quoting MICH. CONST., art. XII, § 2)).
171. See, e.g., Smith v. Atl. Props., Inc., 422 N.E.2d 798, 803 (Mass. App. Ct. 1981) (holding
that a minority shareholder who sought to avoid personal tax liability violated a duty to the
majority by using a supermajority voting rule to block dividend distribution, which caused the
corporation to incur a tax penalty).
172. See Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1992) (upholding a property-tax scheme
passed by ballot initiative that imposed a greater burden on recent land purchasers than on longterm owners).
173. See supra notes 129–36 and accompanying text.
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impose a burden on the minority so long as it is reasonably calculated
to advance the interests of the polity as a whole. Romer could certainly
be read in this manner. The Court found no rational basis for barring
protections from sexual-orientation discrimination.174 It was not
designed to further the public interest; the burden imposed on the
minority was gratuitous. This approach might not be so different from
the duty to vote in the public interest that Foley and Serota and Leib
advocate, though it is obviously differently derived.
But the equitable streak running through the private-law
doctrines of voter duty would seem to require more. Even the most
hands-off views of voter duties in corporate law do not allow the
majority to deprive the minority of its pro rata share in the profits of
the corporation.175 Proportional distribution is a floor beneath which
the majority cannot go, even in pursuit of the corporation’s interests as
a whole. Perhaps the public-law analogue to this floor is equal
protection. Individuals’ status as persons guarantees them at least some
backstop protection from oppression at the hands of the majority, just
as shareholders’ status as shareholders guarantees that the majority
cannot deny them their pro rata share of corporate profits.
The majority obviously cannot use a ballot initiative to impose
policies on the minority that violate equal protection. And the initiative
in Schuette did not go below this floor. The affirmative-action policies
that it rolled back were not constitutionally required (indeed the
Roberts Court has treated affirmative action as barely constitutionally
permissible).176 Justice Kennedy saw what the majority did not as
imposing a special cost on the minority but rather as taking away a
special benefit—a “grant of favored status.”177 If the minority had been
getting more than its pro rata share in the first place through racebased admissions preferences, taking away a benefit might violate a
Pareto-style duty, but it would not go below a pro rata floor. Merely
taking away an extra benefit would not violate a Kaldor-Hicks-style
duty.
But the bans on private discrimination at issue in Reitman, Hunter,
and Romer were not constitutionally required either. The difference?
174. Romer, 517 U.S. at 631–36 (1996); accord Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052, 1086 (9th Cir.
2012) (striking down California a ballot initiative banning same-sex marriage because it lacked a
rational basis), vacated sub nom. Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013).
175. See supra notes 110–11 and accompanying text.
176. See, e.g., Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2419 (2013).
177. Schuette v. Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action, Integration & Immigrant Rights & Fight
for Equal. by Any Means Necessary (BAMN), 134 S. Ct. 1623, 1636–38 (2014) (plurality opinion).
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Perhaps the Court was unwilling to believe that the majority was acting
in good-faith pursuit of the collective good in rolling back
antidiscrimination statutes. At best, in Reitman and Hunter, it was a
selfish attempt to preserve property values in white neighborhoods; at
worst, it was race hatred. And even if there were collective gains to be
had from allowing private housing discrimination, the minority would
not share in any of those gains and would bear the brunt of the costs.
In Romer, likewise, the benefits were questionable and the burdens
concentrated on the minority. In Schuette, by contrast, the Court was
much more willing to believe that the majority acted in good-faith
pursuit of the public interest. And the minority would share in what
Justice Kennedy viewed as the collective benefits of doing away with
affirmative action, with “its latent potential to become itself a source
of the very resentments and hostilities based on race that this Nation
seeks to put behind it.”178 So the initiative in Schuette satisfied a KaldorHicks-style duty, while those in Reitman, Hunter, and Romer did not.
Teasing out where the “pro rata baseline” is and what counts as a
special benefit or cost in any given case will inevitably be difficult and
imprecise. But perhaps in constitutional law, as in corporate law, it is
not the precise content of the substantive standard but rather the
“institution of judicial oversight” that really matters.179 It may be
enough to say that the duties of voters in direct democracy fall
somewhere on the spectrum between Pareto and Kaldor-Hicks and to
count on the courts to employ equitable judgments to root out
opportunism after the fact on a case-by-case basis.180

178. Id. at 1638. Note that this result depends on Justice Kennedy’s view on the substantive
merits of affirmative action. If one thinks that affirmative action is necessary to remedy the effects
of past discrimination, then the burdens of eliminating it fall clearly on the minority, while the
benefits redound primarily to the majority. If, on the other hand, one thinks that affirmative
action is only justified by the educational benefits of diversity shared by all races, then the benefits
and burdens of eliminating it are more evenly distributed among the majority and minority. This
observation may help explain Justice Kennedy’s effective rewriting of Seattle School based on
newly discovered evidence that the busing scheme eliminated by ballot initiative there may have
been remedying prior de jure segregation. Id. at 1633. On this revised account, the busing was not
aimed at diversifying neighborhood primary and secondary schools, the benefits and burden of
which are shared by all; it was necessary to remedy past unconstitutional segregation. And the
ballot initiative that put a stop to it hurt the minority.
179. Coffee, supra note 23, at 1621.
180. See Henry E. Smith, Why Fiduciary Law Is Equitable, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS
OF FIDUCIARY LAW 261, 264, 282 (Andrew S. Gold & Paul B. Miller eds., 2014) (explaining the
importance of ex post flexibility).
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C. Heightened Rationality Review for Direct Democracy
If we think of the Supreme Court as applying a duty to directdemocracy voters that falls somewhere in between Pareto and KaldorHicks, then the analogy to corporate law may support a form of
heightened rationality review for the output of direct democracy.
Recall that in Wilkes, where the court imposed a Kaldor-Hicksstyle duty, the voters’ duties ran primarily to the collective; the majority
could pursue legitimate business purposes for the benefit of the
corporation, even if they worked to the detriment of particular
shareholders. But the majority also had a duty to minimize the harm to
the minority. Thus if there were practicable alternative means to
achieve the legitimate business purpose that would cause less harm to
the minority, the majority had a duty to adopt them.181
Although a similar voter duty applied in the public sphere would
not demand strict scrutiny across the board—Wilkes does not call for a
“compelling” purpose, just a “legitimate” one—its “least restrictive
means” analysis would support a much greater degree of means-ends
testing than is typically associated with rational-basis scrutiny.182
Judicial review of whether the ends were legitimate would necessarily
be limited and could not demand much more than a loose conception
of how the measure furthers the public good. In Wilkes itself, the court
stressed the “large measure of discretion” that majority shareholders
have in determining the “business policy of the corporation.”183 And
courts are not likely to be any better at determining what is in the
public interest than in making business judgments.184 But it could
demand more in terms of means-ends fit than the “anything goes”
approach of standard rationality review; in other words, a sort of
rational-basis-with-bite approach.185

181. See Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc. 353 N.E.2d 657, 663 (Mass. 1976); see also
Pointer v. Castellani, 918 N.E.2d 805, 816 (Mass. 2009) (following Wilkes and holding that the
majority breached its duty in part because alternatives less harmful to the minority were
available).
182. E.g., U.S. R.R. Ret. Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 179 (1980).
183. Wilkes, 353 N.E.2d at 663.
184. See Rave, supra note 13, at 723.
185. Cf. Vill. of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 565 (2000) (striking down as irrational
an easement requirement that applied only to one property owner and not others similarly
situated); Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. Cty. Comm’n, 488 U.S. 336, 345 (1989) (applying
rational basis with bite to strike down a tax assessment system that disfavored recent purchasers);
Ry. Express Agency, Inc. v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 111 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring) (arguing
that rational basis should have more teeth for equal protection than due process).
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Romer, of course, is consistent with this view, though the Court
was focused more on the illegitimacy of the ends (the ballot measure
was motivated by animus) than the choice of means. The Supreme
Court has not adopted an across-the-board rational-basis-with-bite
approach to the outputs of direct democracy, but if we were to take this
sort of voter duty seriously, perhaps it should.186
This suggestion echoes Professor Julian Eule’s argument from
more than twenty-five years ago that courts should give a “hard look”
to laws passed through ballot initiatives.187 Eule argued that because
many of the structural features that justify judicial deference to the
legislative process under the United States v. Carolene Products Co.188
footnote four framework—most notably, structural protections for
minorities—are absent in direct democracy, courts should apply
“heightened ends-means review” to its output.189
The analogy to corporate law, however, adds several things. Eule’s
argument for hard-look review of ballot initiatives has a sort of
“I know it when I see it” quality.190 The corporate analogy tells us what
“it” is: opportunism. And the analogy provides some additional
theoretical grounding from an area of law that focuses intently on the
problem of minority oppression.191
Further, it casts courts in a familiar role, one they are comfortable
playing in the private sphere across many contexts: policing for
opportunism. And acknowledging that role may be more fruitful than
focusing on discriminatory intent—the relentless search for a
constitutional bad actor—as Justice Kennedy tried to do in
reinterpreting Reitman, Hunter, and Seattle to be about targeting racial
minorities because of their race.
The content of corporate-law voter duties offers some limiting
principles on what courts should be looking for when reviewing direct
democracy for minority exploitation. The majority’s duty toward the
186. But see Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1992) (upholding under rational-basis
scrutiny a property tax passed by ballot initiative that imposed disproportionate tax on more
recent purchasers).
187. Eule, supra note 47, at 1558–73.
188. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
189. Eule, supra note 47, at 1568.
190. Id. at 1573 (“Sometimes a hard judicial look will take the form . . . of a candid ‘We know
what’s going on here and we won’t allow any of it.’”).
191. Cf. Chander, supra note 141, at 119 (discussing how corporate law concerns itself with
minority investors). See generally MOLL & RAGAZZO, supra note 69, § 7.01 (discussing the
oppression doctrine); F. HODGE O’NEAL & ROBERT B. THOMPSON, OPPRESSION OF MINORITY
SHAREHOLDERS & LLC MEMBERS (2d ed. 2004) (same).
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minority in corporate law does not deny the majority the right to vote
in its own interests or say that the minority can never be harmed; it is
not a true loyalty or pure Pareto-style duty. But it does require the
majority to vote in pursuit of a good-faith conception of the collective
good and, where possible, avoid visiting disproportionate harm on the
minority.
Finally, thinking about judicial protection of minorities in terms of
voter duties may actually strengthen the primary governance
mechanisms of direct democracy. If voters internalize the idea that they
bear a duty to the minority and think about others’ interests when they
vote, that may improve the preference-aggregation function of
voting.192 If enough voters take this duty seriously, it could reduce the
chances of minority exploitation in the first place. And aggregating
voters’ opinions about their own other-regarding preferences may be
better than having courts guess at what those preferences would be.
To be clear, I am not advocating a duty that would be enforceable
against individual voters in damages suits but rather for courts to play
an institutional role that reacts to opportunism and exploitation, much
like they police for opportunism in private law. And, in fact, courts
already instinctively play this role in many cases reviewing the output
of direct democracy, though they are not always clear about the
intuition that is driving it.
But just as we need more than mere status-based protections in
closely held corporations because the ordinary protections for
minorities (exit, intermediation, etc.) do not work in that context, we
may need more than ordinary equal protection review in direct
democracy where the structural protections for minorities (such as
intermediation, veto points, repeat play, and logrolling) are absent. A
rational-basis-with-bite test—one that requires a good-faith and
plausible explanation for how a law that hurts some minority actually
serves some legitimate public purpose—can serve as a vital
institutional check on a governance process that is necessarily
incomplete in its protection of minorities.

192. In this sense I am sympathetic to Foley and Serota and Leib’s projects, even if I disagree
with their treatment of voters as representatives. See Foley, supra note 14, at 163; Serota & Leib,
supra note 14, at 1601–02.
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IV. SOME POTENTIAL OBJECTIONS AND DISANALOGIES
Some potential objections remain. First, looking to private law to
derive equitable duties for voters in direct democracy does not answer
the hard questions in equal protection law. It does not tell us how to
define the “majority” and the “minority” or which sorts of
classifications should be suspect. We still need the classic tools of equal
protection theory, such as historical analysis and the Carolene Products
footnote, to grapple with these questions. But it can perhaps help
highlight areas where additional judicial scrutiny might be warranted
because structural protections for minorities are inadequate.
Second, and related to the definitional challenges, there is a
substantial difference in the cohesiveness of majority and minority
groups in private law and majority and minority groups in the public
sphere. A shareholder majority, for example, can be a small group or
even a single investor whose interests may be perfectly cohesive across
all issues.193 When the majority is cohesive, the risk of minority
oppression is acute. Coordination is simple and there is little internal
discord standing in the way of action. The majority in the public sphere
will almost always be larger, encompass more diverse interests across
a much broader range of issues, and face a more significant collectiveaction problem when imposing its will.194 After all, each person only
gets one vote.195 And there may be nothing tying the members of the
majority together except their coincidence of interests on a particular
issue. Yet the majority must constitute itself and find a way to work
together if it is to oppress the minority.
A cohesive minority is also harder to define in the public sphere
than in the private. Of course, a diffuse minority is also vulnerable to
exploitation at the hands of the majority,196 though it may be more
difficult to apply a duty running to the minority without being able to
identify the relevant minority.197 And race or other characteristics that
trigger irrational prejudices might motivate the majority itself to define
193. See, e.g., Chander, supra note 141, at 125 (noting that Henry Ford alone represented the
shareholder majority in Ford Motor Company).
194. This is Madison’s central insight in Federalist 10’s “go bigger” strategy for controlling
faction by expanding the size of the Republic to encompass more people and factions so that no
single faction could make up a cohesive majority. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, supra note 29, at
64 (James Madison).
195. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 566 (1964).
196. See Ackerman, supra note 55, at 723–24.
197. But see Miller & Gold, supra note 18, at 517–18 (arguing that fiduciary duties can be
directed to purposes, not only people).
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the relevant minority by treating individuals with those characteristics
as a disfavored group.
Still, there are reasons to believe that direct democracy in
particular may produce cohesive majorities out of a large citizenry with
diverse interests. Because ballot initiatives are limited to a single
subject, they may allow the sort of cohesive faction that Madison so
feared to come together, motivated by a shared passion on a single
issue. And because the vote is a single-shot deal with secret ballots, the
majority may feel little need to restrain itself in the hopes of building
future coalitions on other issues where its members may be less
cohesive.198 Although it may never be as cohesive as a single controlling
shareholder, the majority in direct democracy may be cohesive enough
to pose a real threat to the minority.
Third, deriving voter-specific duties from corporate law can be
risky business because the controlling shareholder is often also a
director (or at least has control over the directors) and thus bears an
independent source of fiduciary duty.199 It can thus be difficult in any
given case to tease out which duties derive from being a voting
shareholder (one of the principals) and which derive from being a
director (an agent). But trying too hard to distinguish these duties may
be elevating form over substance. The majority shareholder has control
over the board of directors because it has the majority of the votes on
all issues, including those that would require a direct shareholder vote,
like a merger. Thus the important relationship is the principal-toprincipal relationship between the majority and minority shareholders,
not the principal–agent relationship between the shareholders and the
board. Further, the fact that other areas of private law impose similar
equitable principal-to-principal duties on partners, bondholders, and
oil and gas interest holders when they vote helps reinforce the notion
that majority shareholder duties can be considered voter duties.
CONCLUSION
Voters are not fiduciaries in the classic sense. They do not
represent anyone other than themselves; they are not agents and need
not subordinate their own interests to any principal. But agency costs

198. See Eule, supra note 47, at 1555–56.
199. See Iman Anabtawi & Lynn Stout, Fiduciary Duties for Activist Shareholders, 60 STAN.
L. REV. 1255, 1269 (2008) (“[T]he degree to which a shareholder controls the board has become
the judicial touchstone of shareholder fiduciary duty.”).
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are only half the problem in a democracy and no problem at all in direct
democracy.
How to control the tyranny of the majority is a far more pressing
concern for direct democracy. And public law has much to learn from
the approaches that private law takes to similarly structured
governance problems. The duties that private law places on voters and
the role that courts play in policing for opportunism can help explain
the Supreme Court’s sometimes erratic approach to direct democracy.
The Court plays a familiar equitable role and steps in to protect
minorities from exploitation at the hands of the majority where the
structural protections for minorities are weakest. And applying similar
duties to voters in the public sphere may suggest that the courts should
take a more skeptical view toward ballot initiatives that affect
minorities and subject them to a heightened form of rationality review.
The Supreme Court’s recent decision in Arizona State Legislature
v. Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission provides a nice
counterpoint. There, the Court upheld Arizona voters’ use of a ballot
initiative to take the power to draw state legislative and congressional
districts out of the hands of state legislators and give it to an appointed
commission.200 In dissent, Justice Thomas was puzzled by the majority’s
“glowing” description of direct democracy and its “paean to the ballot
initiative” when, as he pointed out, the Court has so often shown
“disdain for state ballot initiatives” in the past.201
But the majority was right. This was an example of “direct
democracy at its best.”202 Unlike the examples that Thomas cited, the
Arizona redistricting case did not involve a majority using a plebiscite
to impose costs on, or withdraw a benefit from, a minority. Rather, it
was an attempt by the majority to rein in the self-dealing activities of
its agents—the legislators who were gerrymandering district lines to
entrench themselves. Thus this case did not present the tyranny-of-themajority problem that we depend on courts to police in direct
democracy; rather it shows how the presence of an alternative
majoritarian institution can be a useful safety valve for the other

200. Ariz. State Legislature v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 135 S. Ct. 2652, 2659
(2015).
201. Id. at 2697 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
202. Id. at 2698.
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governance problem Madison identified in representative institutions:
self-dealing agents.203

203. See Rave, supra note 13, at 686; accord Eule, supra note 47, at 1559–60 (noting that
governmental reform through ballot initiative “pose[s] no distinctive threat of majoritarian
tyranny”). Eule did add the proviso that he was skeptical of “reapportionment efforts” through
direct democracy, which he said are often a “façade for disenfranchising minorities.” Id. at 1560.
Here I part ways with Eule, as the primary alternative—leaving redistricting in the hands of selfinterested incumbents—strikes me as far worse. See Rave, supra note 13, at 678.

